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Thesis Abstract
Perhaps the most definitive image of the Second World War 
experience in Great Britain is that of civilian population as 
military target- a society that heroically braced itself against 
the odds, and with an unprecedented sense of unity and sacrifice 
weathered the attacks of the German Luftwaffe to emerge 
victorious. The war of 1939-45 was unlike all others preceding 
it, and this was in large part due to the unavoidably pronounced 
role for civilians in victory (or defeat). Of course, the concept 
of a direct contribution by civilians to the war effort of their 
respective country was nothing new; in the last war, for example, 
civilians who worked in factories that supported forces on the 
continent were directly tied to the outcome of the conflict. In 
this war, however, the technology insured that factories and towns 
themselves would be targets of bombardment.
In preparation for this unprecedented form of Home Front 
warfare, the British Government enacted emergency legislation and 
took complete control over virtually every aspect of British 
society, using centralised planning and policy to transform the 
country into an active war zone. Naturally, however, the complete 
control that the wartime Government had assumed over the country 
was one that did not end at the mere practical side of war 
mobilisation. The survival of the British nation on the Home 
Front required that people throughout Britain risk their lives in 
ARP (Air Raid Prevention) duties, work overtime in war jobs, and 
give up many of the amenities and conveniences of their lives for 
the sake of the war effort.
This kind of unified effort and determination required an 
ideological basis, amply provided by the nationalist sense of 
unity and common purpose that the struggle against the Axis 
brought to the fore. At the outset of war in 1939, however, the 
Government could not be sure that this collective unity and 
confidence (or morale) could sustain the widespread panic and 
disillusion that the bombing of civilians could cause. The 
national identity and determination of the country may have 
provided a fundamental basis for action and mobilisation on the 
Home Front, but the new importance of public opinion and the well­
being of Britain's people as the war continued demanded 
Whitehall's attention. To address this issue, the Ministry of 
Information was formed for the purpose of monitoring and guiding 
"collective morale", as well as coordinating war news and 
conveying centralised Government policy to the wartime media. 
Likewise, the new medium of radio broadcasting, though nominally 
under the authority of Whitehall, would become in the hands of the 
British Broadcasting Corporation..,.a. t^ ggwerfu 1 independent force in 
the fortification of morale througih giropaganda. But unlike other 
more tangible factors in war,, public morale was not easily 
measured or even defined, and thus lent itself easily to the 
biases of those who attempted to assess it.
It is within this broad realm of the loosely defined, yet 
vital factors of ideology and morale on the British Home Front 
that this thesis is concerned. However, while the work must 
include discussion of the British Home Front and trends in 
Government policy pertaining to morale and propaganda, its focus 
will be upon the Glasgow area in the period of relatively heavy 
air attack culminating in 1941, which constituted Germany's only 
direct offensive on Britain's shores. For even as Britain alone 
stood unified against Nazi conquest in Europe, Whitehall's 
assessment of public morale along the Clyde reflected trepidation, 
heavily rooted in perceptions of Scotland as a distinct nation 
within Britain. Though Home Front experience was fundamentally 
the same for civilians throughout Britain, this thesis will show 
that wartime ideology and propaganda had very unique implications 
in Glasgow, due to a perceived ethos of nationhood that was not 
being adequately reinforced from London.
While the volume of published works that discuss civilian 
morale in Britain during this period is extensive, there are few 
if any that approach a study of the Scottish Home Front as a 
distinct nation. There are many possible reasons for this, 
including the virtually indisputable exigency for British unity 
that the prospect of total war had brought, as well as the 
inherent difficulties of historical study which is heavily 
centered on such broad terms. Using research relating to the 
wartime Government's domestic campaign to maintain and reinforce 
public morale, this thesis seeks to explore the influence of what 
became known as "special ideological needs" of the people of 
Scotland, including outlets for a unique strain of nationalism, 
administrative devolution, and increased media attention to 
Scottish Home Front concerns and problems. These "special needs" 
were certainly perceived in Glasgow, which was the region's most 
populous city and the only Scottish area to undergo heavy bombing 
during the war. Perhaps as a result of these distinctions, 
Scotland's needs as stated by politicians seem largely based on 
reports and perceptions emanating from this area.
In looking at the interplay of public morale issues with the 
development and implementation of Government policy on the Home 
Front, it becomes apparent that the Clydeside experience evidences 
a unique incarnation of British wartime nationalism. By 
identifying and examining the claims of exceptional ideological 
issues and alleged threats to wartime ideology present within 
Glasgow, I hope to provide an in-depth look into the substance of 
what was thought to be necessary for preserving civilians' unity 
and war effort. In studying the British Home Front along these 
lines, my conclusions will not only show the level of legitimacy 
that total war on the Home Front brought to specialised interests 
within Scotland, but will reveal the shortcomings of British 
policy and propaganda where it was specifically geared toward the 
alleged ideological needs of a nation within a nation.
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Chapter 1-
Introduction
1At the onset of war in 1939 , there was little 
significant doubt that the people of Glasgow would willingly 
join the rest of Britain in the fight for survival that the 
declaration of war against Germany entailed. The attempts of 
Chamberlain and others to stay the outbreak of total war had 
failed, and the United Kingdom was bracing itself for what 
could be yet another devastating conflict in Europe. As the 
perception and reality of Nazi tyranny spread unchecked 
across Europe, the possibility that the war would be fought 
on British soil was one that very few ignored, especially 
after the failure of Appeasement as a diplomatic alternative 
to hostilities.
The war would soon come to Great Britain. By 1939, 
probably no event in the nation's history had prepared it for 
the direct involvement that would be demanded of the general 
population. Whereas the last war had been fought almost 
solely by armies on the battlefields of Europe, this war was 
destined to be fought in every domestic city as well, by 
civilians on the streets, volunteer firemen and air raid 
recovery personnel, and in the factories as the country 
directly faced the ordeal of mass warfare. The Germans' 
ability to fly bombers on missions over British cities made 
the civilian population of Britain virtual combatants, and 
every town a possible battlefield.
With civilian areas as potential military targets for 
bombers and possibly even an invading army, the vital (and 
unprecedented) importance of the Home Front for this war was 
inescapable to the nation's leaders as well as the 
individuals on the ground. Consequently, mobilsation for war 
in Britain would quickly transform the social, political, and
individuals on the ground. Consequently, mobilsation for war 
in Britain would quickly transform the social, political, and 
economic landscape of the country. In order to hasten this 
transformation from a peacetime civilian society to that of a 
nation at war, a body of temporary laws known as Defence 
Regulations were enacted in 1939, which gave Whitehall the 
power to rule virtually by decree over all aspects of British 
society. ^ For the duration of what would become a global
conflict, the job of "running the war" became an all-
pervasive priority for the British government and a way of
life for the rest of the country. As a result of these
regulations, combined with the general mind set of war 
mobilsation that manifested itself throughout Britain, the 
Government took on a broader view of its own responsibilities 
than ever before. Using these wartime measures, Whitehall 
guided the war effort on every imaginable level with 
centralised planning and policy-making.
While the responsibility of the Government for its 
people expanded during war mobilsation, the role of civic 
duty became a fact of life for the British people. Warfare 
on the Home Front required that many civilians take part in 
the defence of Britain. For some, this meant serving duties 
in an environment that could often become every bit as 
frightening and dangerous as a conventional battlefield. By
' Of significant value in relating the stated Government policies on the 
Home Front to events occurring in Glasgow and elsewhere was the 
political study entitled Civil Liberties During the Second World War by 
Neil Stammers (Croom-Helm, 1983). His work traces the development of 
Defence Regulations through the course of the war and helped to provide 
vital background on the creation and implementation of the legislative 
measures that both enabled and guided ongoing wartime policies. Among 
those relevant here are policies on censorship, prosecution of 
individuals, and various types of domestic political activity, including 
Communism.
frightening and dangerous as a conventional battlefield. By 
June of 1940, for example, local ARP (Air Raid Prevention) 
and other Civil Defence organisations throughout the country 
employed almost a thousand civilians as air raid wardens, 
rescue crews, messengers, and firefighters. After training, 
these volunteers had to maintain a state of readiness to 
prevent and minimise the horrors of mass warfare in their 
respective areas\ In addition to these personnel engaged in 
the generalised ARP services, thousands more would do their 
part from within the other branches of Civil Defence, such as 
the Casualty Service and Auxiliary Policed
Naturally, the complete control that the wartime 
Government had assumed over the country did not end merely at 
the practical side of war mobilsation. If the survival of 
the British nation on the Home Front required people to risk 
their lives in ARP duties, work overtime in war jobs, and 
give up many of the amenities and conveniences of their lives 
for the sake of the war effort, then this kind of unified 
effort required an ideological basis. This was provided in 
large measure by an evolving sense of national unity and 
common purpose that emerged through Britain's struggle 
against the Axis.
Fundamentally, the common ideology that motivated 
civilians' collective war effort and the militarised culture 
of the Home Front itself was British nationalism. If the 
people of Britain showed a willingness to endure the hardship 
and sacrifices of war, then it must have been because they 
believed that Britain was worth fighting for. Of course.
 ^ Terence O'Brien, Civil Defence, HMSO (London) 1955, Appendix X. 
 ^ O'Brien, Appendix X.
4believed that Britain was worth fighting for. Of course, 
nationalism as a doctrine or ideology could encompass varying 
shades of social, cultural, or political opinion. For 
example, individuals or groups within the country could be 
unified in fighting to save Britain from the aggressions of 
the common foe, even if they internalized conflicting 
definitions of Britain and what it meant to be British. As 
long as the common threat endured, such differences would 
seem relatively superficial, co-opted by the common cause.
In 1939, however, the Government could not be sure that 
this collective unity and confidence would withstand the kind 
of widespread panic and disillusionment that could be caused 
by a massive bombing campaign against civilians. Lacking 
direct experience in this new form of warfare, Whitehall 
could only speculate as to the psychological effects of such 
attacks against urban areas. Resting their estimations on 
casualty rates from a few zeppelin raids during the previous 
war, Whitehall made forecasts based on new technology and had 
come to expect the worst^.
Due in part to this grim projection, the Government from 
the earliest days of war mobilsation began to concern itself 
directly with taking active steps to strengthen and preserve 
public morale. The nationalist identity and determination of 
the country may have provided a foundation for action and 
mobilsation on the wartime Home Front, but the new importance 
of public opinion and the ongoing threat to the well-being of 
Britain's people demanded Whitehall's attention. In 1935, as 
the menace of another European war grew more imminent, the 
Ministry of Information was planned as an extension of the 
' O'Brien, p.283.
Ministry of Information was planned as an extension of the 
Home Office, for the purpose of monitoring and guiding 
"collective morale". Additionally, it was responsible for 
coordinating war news and conveying centralised Government 
policy to the media throughout the country in the event of 
war. Though fundamentally modeled after Goebbels' Ministry 
of Propaganda in Germany, the Mol would spend most of the war
constantly reevaluating its role and functions within the
British wartime Government and adapting to changing 
conditions on the Home Front as they were perceived.^
Clearly, the active role to be taken by civilians in 
Britain made morale on the Home Front a vital issue. Unlike 
more tangible aspects of the war effort, however, morale was
not easily measured or defined in specific terms. Tonnage of
shipping produced, the rate of air raid shelter construction,- 
and levels of factory worker absenteeism, for example, could 
be easily monitored and effort directed according to where it 
was needed. Morale and the general state of public opinion 
itself, on the other hand, could not be empirically measured. 
As a result it was subjected to a wide spectrum of 
definitions, depending on the context within which it was 
being interpreted. Even Tom Harrisson, co-founder of Mass 
Observation, an investigative body which submitted case- 
studies to Whitehall on the state of morale in various areas 
throughout the war, was quoted as having remarked, "I am 
unable to define morale. It is too complex and variable"® .
On its most basic level, morale on the Home Front may be 
defined as the moral and mental ability of civilians to
Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale, London: Allen and Unwin, 1979, p.2 
McLaine, p.8.
defined as the moral and mental ability of civilians to 
withstand the hardships and sacrifices of war, coupled with 
public confidence in Britain's ability to eventually win. 
However, beyond this basic definition, its complexity and 
variability arise, because the term is linked directly to the 
wider issue of the ideology of nationalism and its role in 
the everyday life of civilians. In much the same way that 
the common ideology toward British victory could encompass 
any number of varying shades of secondary opinion, the state 
of morale could be subject to varied interpretation. In 
1941, for example, morale in Glasgow seemed precarious to 
observers from London, who in making their evaluation carried 
with them the bias of a different, English strain of wartime 
nationalism.
It is within this broad realm of the loosely defined, 
yet vitally important factors of ideology and morale on the 
British Home Front that this thesis is concerned. The work 
necessarily includes a general discussion of the British Home 
Front, but its emphasis will be upon the experience of 
Glasgow from the onset of war through the period of heavy 
German aerial attack that had abated by the end of 1941. It 
was during this period that a general collapse in morale as 
feared by Whitehall probably would have most directly 
affected the course of the war, since it was these first 
years that witnessed Germany's only direct offensive against 
the shores of Great Britain. The attacks of the Luftwaffe 
were the danger that most concerned the British Government in 
their speculations of civilian morale, and it was during this 
time that enemy bombing brought the war directly to British 
civilians in their own.homes. In contrast, Britain by 1942
7time that enemy bombing brought the war directly to British 
civilians in their own homes. In contrast, Britain by 1942 
would no longer be standing alone against Germany, and large- 
scale civilian bombing would soon be more frequent within 
Germany than in London and other areas. Although ultimate 
victory was still a long way off at the end of 1941, it was 
within this period that Britain achieved its most important 
wartime goal- that of its own survival.
As Scotland's largest city and wartime industrial 
centre, there was good reason for Glasgow to be the subject 
of Government concern surrounding civilian morale during the 
first years of the war. Indeed, these characteristics made 
the city such a likely target for the Luftwaffe, that the 
Mass Observation Unit had possessed the foresight to conduct 
their morale study just before the attack that would strike 
the city in March of 1941. Their alarmist results, when 
compared with reports made after the Clydeside Blitz, reveal 
that Whitehall acknowledged Glasgow and the Scottish region 
even in wartime as a culturally distinct nation from the rest 
of Britain. For though on a general level Home Front 
experience was fundamentally the same for civilians 
throughout Britain, the issues of morale and wartime ideology 
had very unique ramifications along the Clyde, due to 
presumptions on both sides of the border relating to distinct 
Scottish nationhood. In spite of the common cause being 
embraced throughout Britain, reports from Glasgow portrayed a 
group of civilians who saw their role as part of a nation 
within a nation, creating the perception of unique needs for 
morale maintenance that were apparently not being met by the 
propaganda policies of the centralised Government.
morale maintenance that were apparently not being met by the 
propaganda policies of the centralised Government.
While the volume of published works that discuss 
civilian morale in Britain as a whole during this period is
extensive, there are few if any that approach a study of the
Scottish Home Front as a distinct nation. There are many 
possible reasons for this, including the civic unification of 
British nationalism that the prospect of total war had
brought to the Home Front. Also not to be discounted are the
inherent difficulties of historical study that is heavily 
centered on such broad terms. Of equal breadth is the range 
of archival material now available from the period that 
directly or indirectly touches upon morale where an aspect of 
the civilian war effort is discussed. Consistently involved 
in morale and propaganda from inside the Government was the 
Ministry of Information. Though the Ministry's files suffer 
the same shortcomings as other documents on the matter of 
morale, they nonetheless provide valuable insight into the 
perceptions of centralised government toward its civilians 
throughout the conflict.’ It is these perceptions involving 
morale and British ideology within the Clydeside region that 
this thesis will help bring into focus.
Any historical consideration of the British Home Front 
must inevitably touch upon the issue of civilian morale. Its 
influence was pervasive throughout the Home Front and was the 
subject of ongoing Government scrutiny during this period.
’ Specifically, the classes of documents contained in the Public Record 
Office at Kew that were of valuable use in this study are the general 
correspondence of the Mol itself (INF.l), those of the Home Security 
division of the Home Office (HO.205), and those of Home Intelligence 
directly pertaining to the Ministry of Information and its operations 
throughout the war (HO.262).
9subject of ongoing Government scrutiny during this period. 
In "a war of ideas", sound national unity and morale became 
as vital to the war effort at home as on the front lines. 
Willingness to fight as a necessary condition of victory was 
extended directly to British society as a whole for the first 
time. It could be assumed, with hindsight, that morale 
(according to its most basic definition) was adequately 
cohesive and strong, since Britain weathered the attacks of 
the Luftwaffe, eventually winning the war along with her 
allies.
The general experience of British civilians on the Home 
Front, as well as that of the Government under war 
conditions, is addressed in Richard Titmuss' Problems of 
Social Policy, a comprehensive official history of Britain's 
wartime social services. His study is focused on some of the 
challenges faced by civilians and Government in attempting to 
prevent and alleviate the effects of air attack in populated 
areas. This includes the evacuation of children, development 
of the emergency medical services, and provision of shelters 
for those rendered homeless by bombings. Though his study is 
centered on the practical side of mobilsation and life on the 
Home Front, Titmuss makes clear that civilian morale was a 
central issue in most aspects of war preparation as well as 
during attacks and their aftermath. Perhaps more 
importantly, he also observes that prewar speculation as to 
the nature of the morale problem in Britain as a whole would 
prove to be inaccurate. In fact, before war broke out, the 
Committee of Imperial Defence had presumed that the 
psychological effects of civilian bombing would far outweigh 
any physical damage, and that the British social services
10
psychological effects of civilian bombing would far outweigh 
any physical damage, and that the British social services 
would be overwhelmed with masses of panic-stricken 
individuals whose resolve had been broken by the horror of 
air raids.® By showing how these problems were actually among 
the least frequent, Titmuss establishes that fundamentally, 
the British public held up to the challenges presented by war 
fought on a Home Front.
Just as Titmuss examines the British Home Front from the 
practical side of the social services, Terence O'Brien gives 
a thorough examination of the development and operations of 
ARP and other wartime services in Civil Defence. In his 
comparison of prewar expectations and the reality of 
Britain's Home Front, O'Brien reaffirms Titmuss' conclusion. 
Both point out that contrary to the previous assumptions of 
Whitehall (and other organisations concerned with morale), 
the experience of air raids did much to bolster civic unity 
and resolve among the general public. This was due in large 
part to the active role taken by volunteers in ARP and 
Auxiliary Forces, and its unifying effect on communities 
throughout the realm. O'Brien argues that morale, though 
open to widely varying definition, was at its worst during 
periods of low enemy activity on the Home Front, such as 
during the "Phoney War" leading up to Hitler's invasion of 
Norway in the spring of 1940. It was throughout this period 
that, after having rapidly prepared the island of Britain for 
what was expected to be a "knockout blow" of aerial 
bombardment, civilians and Civil Defence personnel found 
themselves merely waiting for an attack that seemed as if it
Richard Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy, HMSO (London) 1950, p . 18.
11
themselves merely waiting for an attack that seemed as if it 
might never come. This period is in contrast to that of the 
Blitz that began on London in the autumn of 1940, when in the 
face of the common threat presented by the German air force, 
the public seemed to be entirely committed to the singular 
cause of fighting the war.
In considering these histories of the Home Front, it is 
clear that when the prospect of war in Britain had become 
reality, the breakdown of public confidence and resolve that 
had hitherto been expected by Whitehall was never realised. 
Rather, the common threat of aerial bombardment served to 
cement the resolve of the public by providing the community 
with the all-encompassing goal of fighting and winning the 
war. Both works mention difficulties that were experienced 
on a practical level in mobilsation and implementation of 
wartime measures, such as slow preparation of ARP in many 
areas and unauthorised evacuations (or, "trekking") of 
civilians. Such trends were perceived to be indicative of 
poor civilian morale; however, these and other difficulties 
were considered primarily logistical and administrative, 
rather than ideological. The "maintenance of preparedness 
versus the avoidance of panic", as O'Brien describes it, 
certainly carried difficulties, but by war's end these would 
be seen as exceptions to the rule rather than fundamental 
problems. Within this context, it is demonstrated that many 
of the problems of conducting war on the Home Front were 
overcome by Whitehall and the various services as they 
adapted to actual wartime conditions. However, because 
these histories do not specifically address perceived threats 
to sanctioned wartime ideology itself, they shed little light
12
these histories do not specifically address perceived threats 
to sanctioned wartime ideology itself, they shed little light 
on the direct methods by which the Government attempted to 
assess and strengthen morale.
If the victory of the Allies is sufficient proof that 
morale was strong in Britain, then the study of the Home 
Front from the standpoint of morale is one that is best not 
undertaken as a means by which to support direct 
interpretations of the war's outcome. Rather, its contexts 
and uses can be an indication of the perceptions that linked 
the British wartime Government with its people. Ian McLaine 
uses this approach in his history of the Ministry of 
Information, which gives an analysis of the often ill-fated 
attempts of Whitehall in bolstering morale on the Home Front. 
His discussion makes an attempt to assess the pervasive 
ideology of the Home Front by focusing on the Government 
department that was created to assess and maintain it. When 
seen in this way, it becomes clear that difficulties on the 
part of the Government in defining morale often stemmed from 
the inherent biases of those who were working to fulfill the 
Ministry's occupation. Their objectives were to identify 
threats to the "inherent" unity of the war effort among the 
heterogeneous general public, and to take active steps to 
diffuse them.
Naturally, not all of these perceived threats posed a 
serious actual danger to the collective unity of the country. 
If minority groups along the Clyde or elsewhere who 
ideologically opposed the Government had had a profound 
influence over public opinion throughout the country, they 
would have eroded the national war effort. But groups like
13
influence over public opinion throughout the country, they 
would have eroded the national war effort. But groups like 
the Communist Party, provincial Nationalists in Scotland and 
Wales, and workers who took part in strikes within war 
industries certainly represented a break from sanctioned 
ideology in the eyes of the centralised wartime Government. 
After all, the relative influence of such groups was not only 
an indication of unfavourable public opinion toward the wider 
British nationalism of Home Front ideology, but many of their 
actions were also criminal offenses after the passing of 
Defence Regulations in the Commons.
In assessing the state of British Home Front morale as 
interpreted by the Ministry, McLaine reaffirms the essential 
conclusions of Titmuss and O'Brien, that contrary to prewar 
expectations, German attacks on the cities of Britain were 
actually highly effective in bolstering morale, since all 
other immediate concerns paled in comparison with the common 
cause of fighting the war, staying alive, and saving Britain. 
Morale (in this context) was eventually thought to be 
indestructible. As to whether or not the Ministry of 
Information was ever successful in perceiving or successfully 
serving the needs of the British public in its morale- 
maintenance, McLaine asserts that as with many aspects of 
wartime government, the Ministry of Information's 
difficulties were overcome as the war continued, both from 
the adjustment of the public to wartime conditions and from 
the evolution in their own policy that came with experience.
While McLaine's history illustrates the difficulties and 
evolution within the centralised Government as it attempted 
to identify and meet the ideologically-orientated needs of
14
evolution within the centralised Government as it attempted 
to identify and meet the ideologically-orientated needs of 
the British populace, Angus Calder stresses the effects of 
the morale issue on civilians themselves in The People's War, 
a comprehensive social history of the Home Front. In 
considering the new urgency that total war had brought to the 
perceived needs of the working classes, Calder asserts that 
an unprecedented, almost revolutionary empowerment of the 
civil society throughout Great Britain was the result.® With 
the working class comprising almost 7 0 percent of the 
population, actively mobilised into a militant whole, the 
willing cooperation and sacrifice that would be demanded of 
the people would have to be reciprocated with concessions on 
the part of the wartime Government. More was being required 
of the civilian population than ever before, and with it came 
the implication not only of a British nation preserved 
through hard work and sacrifice for the war effort, but also 
a victory that would ensure a better way of life for the 
majority of British people than had existed before.
Calder also points out that where the specific needs of 
the people were being overlooked by the Government, civilians 
were capable of taking charge at a grass-roots level, thus 
directly influencing and guiding Government policy. This is 
probably most notably exhibited in 1940, when thousands of 
Londoners, in search of adequate deep shelter during air 
raids, took it upon themselves to occupy the Underground 
stations, and rather than prohibit their use, the ARP 
services resolved to ensure that stations throughout the city 
would remain open to the public. Such initiative in London
Angus Calder, The People's War, Pimlico (London) 1969, p . 18.
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would remain open to the public. Such initiative in London 
and other areas served the national interest and reinforced 
public confidence, but was often in spite of rather than as a 
result of Whitehall's specific policies.
Clearly, the nature of militarised life on the Home 
Front, with its necessary sacrifices for the war effort, was 
conducive to a fundamental ideological unity, with public 
opinion reflecting the British context of nationalism. As 
Calder points out, the war even lent a profound sense of 
democracy to civilians throughout the country, giving them a 
new voice in their own destiny. Of course, being a 
heterogeneous nation, there were inevitable incidents of 
behaviour and ideologies within Britain that could be 
perceived as being in conflict with the mind set of the Home 
Front. However, this was also more a result of the new 
influence that the working classes had been given by the 
importance of public morale and national unity. The fact 
that collective civilian morale did remain fundamentally 
strong throughout the Blitz and beyond has supported, as 
Calder has asserted, "a myth of British or English moral 
preeminence, buttressed by British unity."’®
Calder, in Myth of the Blitz, investigates this mind set 
in depth, and concludes that the ideological unity and 
willingness of civilians on the Home Front to make sacrifices 
on behalf of the war effort fall into a broad 'mythological 
ethos' that motivated civic action and maintained resolve on 
the Home Front, as well as serving to purify memory and 
collective experience after the war had ended. In clarifying 
this mentality as it relates to the war, Calder mentions the
Angus Calder, Myth of the Blitz, Pimlico (London) 1991, p.2.
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this mentality as it relates to the war, Calder mentions the 
evacuation of Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the period 
of heavy urban bombing during the Blitz as events that 
quickly became moments of "absolute definitiveness" for the 
character of the British nation as a whole, and hence 
justification for victory, both when these events actually 
occurred and thereafter.” The nation-defining heroism of 
democratic Britain's lone struggle against Nazi conquest was 
carried into every aspect of individuals' daily lives 
throughout Britain, either directly or through the wartime 
media, and was the natural basis for the civic unity and 
patriotism that had become more vital than ever. In this 
sense, such events, rather than exist as mere history (both 
then and now) , are imbued with a certain sense of natural 
justification that isolated contradictions occurring at the 
time (such as strikes and other violations) could do little 
to refute. Such contradictions occurring in Scotland easily 
fit into this myth with hindsight, but if ideology and unity 
on the Home Front fundamentally rested on a myth of "English 
preeminence", morale in a Scottish area like Clydeside 
certainly would have seemed precarious to some who assessed 
it.
This myth of preeminence, as Calder describes it, is 
primarily what gives a fundamental basis to the militant 
nationalism that is brought to the forefront within any 
nation at a time of war, especially one being fought on its 
own shores as with the British war of 1939-41. Such a war by 
definition presents an entire society with obvious, specific, 
and universal goals which overlap and co-opt most others. As
Calder, Myth, p.l.
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and universal goals which overlap and co-opt most others. As 
culturally and politically heterogeneous as Britain may have 
been in 1940, very few people could realistically have argued 
that their lot would be improved if Scotland or any other 
part of Britain were to become an occupied province of the 
German Reich.
The strength of this mind set and culture of unity, 
however, could only remain intact for as long as the 
perception of a common threat endured. As mentioned, 
published history has established that during the eight-month 
period of 'Phoney War' leading up to the Luftwaffe's all-out 
aerial attack on Britain, morale was considered to be at its 
nadir. After mobilising the general population to direct and 
urgent action, and using Defence Regulations to transform the 
entire island summarily into a war zone, the Government 
suffered criticism from all directions when the Luftwaffe's 
poor showing in the skies over Britain began to make it look 
as if the Home Front, with all of its restrictions and 
inconveniences, had not been necessary after all. By 
contrast, the image of a united Britain holding fast under 
German aerial attack was virtually unavoidable from that 
summer onwards, when the RAF, with the numerical odds against 
them, fought (and won) what would become the longest, most 
intense air battle in the history of warfare.
Clearly, the nationalistic ideology of a common struggle 
against the Axis could overlap and incorporate most any other 
ideology or community within Britain, as long as it was 
accepted that the need to win the war was a top priority, and 
the threat clearly perceived. The Ministry of Information 
and the Government, taking on the direct responsibility of
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the threat clearly perceived. The Ministry of Information 
and the Government, taking on the direct responsibility of 
reinforcing this fundamental unity, however, were naturally 
wary of the influence that ideologies like communism, 
pacifism, and provincial nationalism could have on civilians' 
motivations for fighting the war. This was a concern acted 
upon throughout the country, where the Mol, Mass Observation, 
and other groups like the British Broadcasting Corporation 
constantly strived to solidify not only the perception of the 
common threat, but also fast recognition of direct action to 
be taken in preventing the spread of potentially detrimental 
ideologies.
The histories that focus on various difficulties faced 
by the Government on the Home Front invariably remain within 
the scope of British experience generally, making mention of 
specific communities where relevant. However, one portion of 
the country where Government concern for reinforcing British 
wartime nationalism seemed to be especially focused was 
within Scotland, and perhaps for good reason from the point 
of view of London. As Mass Observation's morale study in 
Glasgow makes clear, there certainly was a presence of groups 
in Scotland whose ideology threatened the wartime mind set of 
unity, such as the Scottish Nationalist Party, in whom the 
Government saw the potential of a "Sinn Fein" movement 
similar to that which led to Eire's independence from Great 
Britain, Likewise, Communism seemed to be a potentially 
stronger force in Scotland than the rest of the country. The 
area in and around Glasgow had developed a long tradition of 
Communist-affiliated labour unrest, establishing for the city 
its nickname "The Red Clyde". In the last war, Lloyd George
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Communist-affiliated labour unrest, establishing for the city 
its nickname "The Red Clyde". In the last war, Lloyd George 
had even sent the military into Glasgow's George Square to 
squelch a general strike that had begun within that city's 
munitions industry, and the district of West Fife had elected 
Britain's only Communist MP (Willie Gallacher), whose 
criticism of the Government's domestic policies certainly did 
not relent with the outbreak of war, as Commons debate 
transcripts show.
Aside from these and other more specific perceived 
threats to morale, there were also certain fundamental 
reasons why Whitehall might have seen fit to think of 
Glaswegian morale as a separate issue from that of other 
industrial centres in Britain. After all, if sound public 
opinion and/or morale was contingent upon a certain amount of 
militarised nationalism, then that nationalism would have to 
be one with which the people on the British Home Front as a 
whole could readily identify. The people of Glasgow 
certainly did identify with the broad mind set of the Home 
Front, acknowledging the Axis as a common enemy to be 
defeated, but this unity was qualified by the fact that 
Scotland was in many ways a separate nation within Britain, 
possessing its own history and cultural traditions, even a 
different language in remote parts of the country. 
Scotland's history, in addition to being simply unique from 
that of England, was also one imbued with a long tradition of 
active resistance to English culture and law, playing no 
small part in how the Scottish nation as a whole defined
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itself.^
Certainly these fundamental cultural and civic 
distinctions would be a matter for consideration by the Mol 
and the rest of the centralised Government, if they hoped to 
assess and maintain morale within the Scottish region from 
four hundred miles south of its border. Perhaps the first 
attempt to address the difficulties created by this physical 
and ideological distance was in 193 9, when the Government 
passed the Reorganisation of Offices (Scotland) Act. The 
Act, intended to remove the strain from the previously 
London-based administration of the Scottish Region, centred 
Scottish governmental departments in Edinburgh, headed by the 
Scottish Secretary of State, whose duties included 
representing "the Scottish point of view" and safeguarding 
"Scottish interests"." This administrative devolution was 
granted primarily due to the practical difficulties of 
governing Scotland from London during wartime, but there was 
also an acknowledgment of the need for distinctly Scottish 
interests to be dealt with in Edinburgh. The broadly-defined 
duties of the Scottish Secretary gave him the ability to 
address the Government on a wide range of issues; in a 
wartime context, these issues would come to be linked almost 
invariably with Home Front morale as it related to Scotland.
Scotland's unique practical needs may have been what
fueled the development of this relatively self-contained
aspect of the wartime Government, but it inevitably became a
platform for what became known as special ideological need as 
Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland, Molendinar Press 
(Glasgow) 1977, p-3.
“ Scottish Home and Health Dept, Correspondence, HH.45.34, taken from 
Ian Levitt, ed. , The Scottish Office- Depression and Reconstruction 
1919-1959. Pillans & Wilson (Edinburgh) 1992, p.99.
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platform for what became known as special ideological need as 
well. This tendency was established most fervently by Thomas 
Johnston, who acted as Scottish Secretary of State through 
most of the war. Johnston, before joining the War Cabinet, 
had acted as Civil Defence Commissioner for Scotland, an 
occupation that had given him firsthand experience not only 
as an administrator over Scottish wartime affairs, but one 
that had also provided him with a solid background in the use 
of morale as a pillar in political argument." Like the rest 
of Britain in wartime, potential threats to morale became 
latent concerns in almost any matter relating to Scotland on 
the Home Front, but the perception of distinct Scottish Home 
Front experience in the Commons and Cabinet was also one that 
was nurtured by the Scottish Office and Scottish Members of 
Parliament whenever possible. In much the same way that 
British people as a whole had become empowered by the 
necessities of a Home Front war, Scottish politicians like 
Johnston were provided with an opportunity to convey a new 
dimension of legitimacy for Scottish concerns, most of which 
(such as Glasgow's industrial unrest) had existed long before 
1939."
This perception of distinct wartime stakes underpinning
the direction of Scottish unity and loyalty was one that was
often reinforced by Government organisations charged with
monitoring public opinion in the Region. This is clearly
present on the eve of the Clydeside Blitz, when Mass
Observation warned that the city's inhabitants were having "a 
Graham Walker, Thomas Johnston, Manchester U. Press, 1988, p.148.
" An important survey book on Scottish History for this work was 
Christopher H a r v i e 's No Gods and Precious Few Heroes (Edinburgh U. 
Press, 1993), which provided a good fundamental overview of issues 
concerning Scotland between the w a r s .
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Observation warned that the city's inhabitants were having "a 
war of their own", ensconced in industrial relations and 
other matters, and displaying an apathy toward "the English 
war" that was indicative of detachment from the civic unity 
(in the British context) upon which the outcome of the war 
supposedly rested." Glaswegian workers, in addition to 
appearing generally sympathetic to Communism, were also 
taking advantage of full employment to strike with impunity 
on a regular basis. As to whether Glaswegians perceived a 
common threat, one that would provide a fundamental basis for 
unity with the rest of Britain, this was also found to be 
lacking, because the people of Glasgow generally did not 
expect to fall victim to German air raids. Sympathy was 
expressed for the inhabitants of London, but few seemed to 
identify themselves directly with their countrymen to the 
South." A reversal in this trend of apathy was reported 
after the Luftwaffe visited Glasgow in March of that year, 
but the perception of questionable unity remained.
The actual effects of this complacency and self­
absorption on public support for the war effort were 
certainly exaggerated, being as none of the fears (including 
Communist uprising) of Whitehall were ever realised in the 
Glasgow area, or any other region of Scotland. If 
Glaswegians were in fact "fighting a war of their own", then 
this tendency must have co-existed with the ideology of the
This Mass Observation "Preliminary Report on Morale in Glasgow" , held 
at the Strathclyde Regional Archives within the Mitchell Library in 
Glasgow (file AGN.2252), is organised and presented according to what 
the M-0 group presumed would be the most indicative social trends in 
diagnosing the local state of public morale, including general 
expectation of heavy raids, and percentage of overheard conversations 
which discussed the war in general.
AGN.2252
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Home Front in general. However, the brand of nationalism 
particular to Scotland was one that manifested itself in ways 
that the centralised Government in London perceived as being 
somehow a matter for special attention. Threats to morale in 
Scotland were often just as prevalent in Britain as a whole, 
but were assessed with more urgency in Scotland, due to the 
already-existing conception of Scotland as a community that 
internalized its own ethos of nationhood. This ethos, and 
ways that it contributed to Scottish morale, could never be 
actively reinforced from London without significant 
difficulty.
Just as the onset of the war on the British Home Front 
seemed to open a door to the practical importance of special 
Scottish administrative needs, there also arose a new medium 
through which guidance and influence over public opinion 
could be established. Maintenance of unity and loyalty on 
the Home Front in the 'war of ideas' would be naturally based 
on the inherent sense of nationhood and need for survival 
that intensified with the approach of war. Still, to 
reinforce this mind set on the Home Front would require the 
centralised control of the British mass media, effectively 
converting it into the largest internal propaganda system 
ever devised in Great Britain. The Ministry of Information, 
in its defined duty of actively maintaining and defining 
morale, provided services directly to the population of 
Britain through a constant output of posters, newsreels, 
town-hall-style 'information meetings', and other services. 
After the advent of Defence Regulations, the Mol also had 
indirect control over all news and other material (such as 
that which was released in the press), and oversaw censorship
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not only of news that could be of strategic value to the 
enemy, but also any views that ran against the current of 
wartime ideology."
Along with this new degree of control over the mass 
media ushered in with the outset of war and Defence 
Regulations, Britain also saw the rise of a powerful, 
centralised, and largely independent new medium that would 
prove indispensable in maintaining the link between 
Government and civilians. Radio broadcasting, after rising 
through the 1920s and 30s to a significant place within 
British popular culture, was originally intended to be 
discontinued altogether at the outbreak of hostilities. The 
BBC instead became a major complement to the British 
Government's domestic and foreign propaganda effort, allowing 
the message of democratic unity and loyalty to reach a much 
greater audience.
Due to the exclusive control that the British 
Broadcasting Corporation has had over the medium since its 
beginnings, the very history of radio as it pertains to 
wartime propaganda is also the wartime history of the BBC. 
Therefore, it is not realistic to explore broadcasting as 
merely another arm of the Ministry of Information's domestic 
propaganda campaign, but rather as a largely separate entity, 
whose policies worked to achieve similar goals. Perhaps the 
most comprehensive history of the Corporation is the four- 
volume work of Asa Briggs, which includes a detailed study of 
the BBC on the Home Front, when it was supposedly under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Information. As Briggs 
argues, the war had a profound impact on the development of
Stammers, p. 14.
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the BBC, allowing its influence to reach a larger audience 
and its internal structure to grow. However, the influence 
that was wrought on the Home Front in the area of domestic 
propaganda by the still-fledgling medium of broadcasting was 
certainly more profound." For though technically under Mol 
supervision, the BBC by 1940 had begun to take the 
initiative, becoming an independent force on the Home Front 
at a time when the Ministry of Information was under 
widespread criticism for its own organisation and methods. 
The BBC did not escape such criticism, but for a medium that 
was originally going to to be taken out of operation 
altogether (for security reasons) in 1939, the growth of 
broadcasting during the war was significant. The size of the 
BBC staff would grow from 4,889 in the beginning of the war 
to 11,663 by 1944."“
In his history of the Corporation, Briggs also shows how 
war gave the BBC a vital task on the Home Front, and its 
fulfillment not only provided British civilians with a unique 
link to the Government, but also endowed the public with a 
broad perspective on the effects that their individual 
efforts were having on the war effort. The most immediate 
technical effect of the war on broadcasting itself was the 
synchronisation of transmitters, which tuned all broadcasts 
to one single wavelength in order to avoid providing 
direction-finding signals to the enemy's bombers."  ^
Synchronisation concentrated the BBC's programming in London 
for the duration of the war, and the content of the
Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Vol. 
Ill- The War of Words. London (Oxford U.), 1970, p. 3.
Ibid, p.18.
Briggs, p. 46.
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programming was the product of this centralisation. To many 
listeners this centralised broadcast possessed a certain 
bias; namely that of the Home-Counties Englishman.
Some of the difficulties created within Scotland by the 
technical necessity of synchronisation are addressed by W.H. 
McDowell in the History of BBC Broadcasting in Scotland, 
which mentions some of the effects that came with the 
disappearance of regionally-based wavelengths. McDowell 
observes that because synchronisation had so drastically 
limited the amount of programmes that could be broadcast to 
suit special interests, the BBC's centralised broadcasts were 
"expected to have general rather than regional appeal"."" 
McDowell also mentions that the lack of adequate Scottish 
programming on the wireless was seen largely as a necessary 
sacrifice for the war effort, and was actually very 
instrumental in establishing a greater amount of post-war 
control over programming from within the Scottish Region.
Both of these general histories make clear the 
significant development undertaken by the BBC throughout the 
war, as well as the practical difficulties that war brought 
to radio programming on the British Home Front. However, the 
issue of Scottish programming needs as they related directly 
to Home Front ideology and morale is merely mentioned in 
passing, part of the broad overview that is given of 
broadcasting in the Regions. As these are general histories 
of the BBC, the focus is necessarily placed away from many of 
the issues that will be of primary concern in this thesis, 
such as the ongoing debate over the importance of an
W.H. McDowell, The History of Broadcasting in Scotland, 1923-83, Allen 
& Unwin, 1992, p.44.
27
independent Scottish wavelength and the implications of the 
Scots' special ideological need on that debate.
It is clear that radio broadcasting was a monumental 
force on the Home Front. Naturally, such a powerful medium 
would be one over which the wartime Government would 
endeavour to have some direct control, yet as Briggs has 
pointed out, this never transpired, and this places wartime 
broadcasting in stark contrast to other media and propaganda 
in the period. The British Broadcasting Corporation, though 
under a certain amount of nominal Government regulation, was 
allowed to develop as an independent propaganda force on the 
Home Front. This independence from Whitehall gave the BBC 
and its Director-General (John Reith) an appearance of 
objectivity that could not be easily established by any other 
wartime media, and provided radio with the ability to serve 
the needs of the Home Front public using their already- 
existing system of listener polling. Their conversion from 
peacetime entertainer to wartime propagandist was certainly 
not an easy one, however, and the BBC suffered many of the 
difficulties of the Mol and Government in interpreting its 
role on the Home Front.
Just as the Government itself was criticised throughout 
the war for not adequately addressing the distinctive aspects 
of unity and patriotism inherent in a Scottish population, 
there also came a great deal of negative reaction to the 
propaganda methods used for this maintenance, including 
radio. Out of technical expediency, the general censorship 
operations of the Mol had been largely de-centralised to 
allow a separate office in Scotland working in conjunction 
with the newly de-centralised Edinburgh administration, but
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war had brought the opposite effect to the BBC. 
Synchronisation of transmitters meant that for much of the 
war, the only programming available to Scots on the wireless 
was that which was centrally broadcast from London, and this 
was necessarily geared in content toward an audience that was 
primarily English. Since Scotland was not only a region but 
a nation within Britain, this de prioritisation of a 
significant home-grown Scottish influence on BBC programming 
inevitably created the perception of an active practice of 
cultural censorship.
In an effort to rectify this tendency toward cultural 
exclusion on the wireless, Johnston and others from the 
outset of war began to argue strongly in favour of a separate 
radio wavelength for the Scottish region in correspondence to 
the BBC and Ministry of Information. The case for an 
independent Scottish programme, being largely an issue of 
morale-maintenance, can be readily analysed from an 
historical point of view as a test-case in the study of how 
Scotland's ideological needs as exhibited by the Glasgow 
morale reports factored into Home Front propaganda policy in 
general. Presumedly, radio as a medium of propaganda drew 
its strength from its inherent cross-cultural appeal, and its 
ability to influence the audience by bringing the spoken word 
directly into British homes. As a source of nationalist 
propaganda like any other, however, the power of broadcasting 
to co-opt its audience could be easily compromised if it was 
perceived to be in ignorance of the culture upon which the 
inherent nationalism of a specific audience is founded. The 
reaction of Johnston and others to what were considered by 
the BBC and Mol to be practical and inadvertent programming
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oversights was indicative of this ignorance, and hence a 
serious danger to favourable public opinion. Its most 
immediate cultural effect was to leave a void that enemy 
broadcasts from across the channel would all too readily 
(though clumsily) attempt to fill. The Mol and the BBC both 
acknowledged the separate listening needs of Scotland as a 
legitimate factor in effective morale maintenance, in need of 
attention. The added wavelength was never realised, however, 
due to technical limitations of the wartime service.
In looking at the British Home Front experience on a 
general level, it is apparent that the mind set of unity and 
patriotism among civilians was one that remained 
fundamentally intact. This conclusion is readily supported 
by the fact that eventually the country arose victorious from 
the ashes of the Blitz to defeat the Axis powers. Victory 
was due in no small measure to the successful mobilsation of 
the civilian population into a virtual fighting force that 
resembled in many ways the conventional military. After all, 
the nature of war by 1939 required civilians to take on many 
of the necessary qualities of soldiers; to act on directives 
that at times may not have seemed entirely justified, and to 
live a daily existence in what had become a frightening, 
uncomfortable and sometimes dangerous environment.
One of the most prominent effects of this large-scale 
mobilsation and militarisation of civilians was a greatly 
broadened sense of responsibility of the British government 
to its people. In order to be able to administrate over the 
country in total war, the Government passed legislation 
giving it the power to oversee all aspects of the Home Front, 
including that of public opinion. To maintain morale among
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British civilians, the Government had to ensure that faith in 
the struggle for survival and victory was ever-present. To 
this end, an entire Ministry was created within the 
Government, for the purpose of producing domestic propaganda 
as well as identifying potential threats to morale. The 
morale of the British people had been thrust to the level of 
utmost importance by the outset of total war, and its 
maintenance became a fundamental wartime objective for the 
wartime Government on the Home Front.
Using research based on the wartime Government's ongoing 
domestic campaign to maintain and reinforce public morale and 
ideological unity, this thesis seeks to explore the influence 
of what became known as "special ideological needs" of the 
people of Scotland. These "special needs" were certainly 
perceived by Whitehall when morale was closely examined in 
Glasgow, and were the primary justification used by Scottish 
politicians like Johnston when attempting to argue for 
changes in Home Front policy, such as the introduction of 
separate radio programming for Scotland. Specifically, these 
needs included outlets for a unique form of nationalism, 
administrative devolution, and increased media attention to 
Scottish Home Front concerns and problems. In looking at the 
interplay between civilians in the Clydeside region and the 
Government bodies concerning themselves with morale 
throughout Britain, it becomes apparent that Glasgow's 
experience evidences various levels of community with unique 
needs. By identifying and examining these ideological needs, 
an in-depth understanding will be gained of the substance of 
what was thought to be necessary for preserving unity and war 
effort. By analysing the war along these lines, conclusions
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will show the level of legitimacy that total war brought to 
provincial interests on the Home Front. In doing so, the 
study will also reveal the shortcomings of British policy and 
propaganda where it was geared toward the alleged ideological 
needs of "a nation within a nation" on the Home Front.
Part 1-
Scotlandf Government, 
and
Guiding Wartime National Unity 
on the 
Home Front
Chapter 2-
Preparing for the 'Knock-Out Blow'
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In 1939 , the crisis presented to the nation of Great 
Britain at the onset of war against Germany was one that 
could not easily be denied. The nature of warfare itself, 
with the introduction of heavy civilian bombing, had 
brought every man, woman, and child onto the Front lines, 
and survival would depend on the strength of that 'Home- 
Front'. The common purpose that existed in Great Britain 
towards survival and victory in this new theatre of warfare 
brought a vital importance to the maintenance of national 
spirit and individual sacrifice. If unity and morale, the 
primary factors of wartime public opinion, were allowed to 
falter through unpreparedness for attack, inefficient 
administration, or apathy of the general populace to the 
policies and aims of the British wartime Government, then 
the war could be lost.
War had transformed the British nation. Of course, as 
the Government began to make attempts to define and 
quantify morale throughout the heterogeneous British 
public, there developed a perception of potential threats 
to the unity and fighting spirit of the country. Most of 
these perceived threats occurred throughout Britain, yet by 
looking into such threats within the Scottish Region, it 
seems that the unity and strength of public opinion was at 
several stages assessed with more urgency than in other 
areas. Scotland's unique position of being a relatively 
independent cultural and civic nation in Britain, with its 
own Department of State, meant that the pervading ideology 
of the unified British Home Front would have to co-exist 
with a form of national resolve in a Scottish context. 
Although threats to unity and morale within Scotland were
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Scottish context. Although threats to unity and morale 
within Scotland were considered latent, many politicians, 
such as Secretary of State Thomas Johnston, used the image 
and potential implications of such threats in an attempt to 
ensure that the war would win some concessions for the 
Scottish nation.
"...If these great trials were to come upon 
our island, there is a generation of Britons here 
now ready to prove itself not unworthy to the 
days of yore and not unworthy of those great men, 
the fathers of our land, who laid the foundations 
of our laws and shaped the greatness of our
country..."
-Winston Churchill addressing the House of 
Commons, September 1939.
The outbreak of war with Germany in September 193 9
brought with it much cause for unity within British
society. The 'front line' of this conflict would not be a 
far-off battlefield, as in 1914-18. It would include the 
entire civilian population in an unprecedented Home Front 
theatre of total warfare. Not only would workers be 
struggling to maintain the level of industrial and 
agricultural output necessary to sustain the total war 
effort, but they would be striving to survive direct attack 
by the Germans as well. This attack could come from the 
air, as the Luftwaffe attempted to defeat Britain in a
"Knock-out Blow" of sustained heavy bombardment, or from 
Britain's own beaches as the Germans launched a large-scale 
invasion. It was quite clear that this war would be fought 
not only by militaries, but by entire nations, and the 
one(s) that held up best under war conditions, both
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war conditions, both practically and psychologically, would 
reap victory.
In short, the British home front at the outbreak of 
war was a scene not only for unprecedented national 
purpose, but also a level of physical effort and fortitude 
that was apparently unavoidable to the individual. 
Mobilisation for the war, though ongoing since the 
thirties, had begun in earnest since the 1938 Munich 
Crisis. By the time threat of war with Germany became 
reality in September of 1939, for example, 1,500,000 men 
and women had joined local ARP volunteer services.^ 
Individuals generally recognised an active role in the 
universal goal of victory.
The British public as a whole had become militarised 
in its preparations for war on the Home Front, and a widely 
accepted national identity, thrust to the ideological fore 
by threat of destruction, played no small part in the 
maintenance of that unity. This might seem obvious enough; 
after all, as one scholar of nationalism has observed, a 
national identity (particularly during wartime) is 
generally defined and reinforced not only by its idealised 
view of history and unique qualities of its people, but by 
a belief that these are worth preserving through sacrifices 
made on an individual level,"
However, while strong morale and ideological unity 
amongst the British public seemed self-evident when it came 
to supporting their own nation in war, the Government from
the outset began to debate not only the practical
 ^ Terence O'Brien, Civil Defence, HMSO (London) 1955, p.286.
 ^ Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland, Molendinar Press 
(Glasgow) 1977, p.5.
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of morale, but what methods, if any, should be used in its 
maintenance. The war had given a heterogeneous nation a 
common goal, but the sacrifices that the Government 
required of individuals would have to be justified as 
absolutely necessary. Specifically, these sacrifices would- 
have to appear as being shared equally throughout all 
strata of society. With the working class comprising over 
seventy percent of a militarised population, the 
implications of a break-down of wartime civil solidarity 
were not lost on the nation's leaders."
The presentation of the common, undivided "national 
case" on the Home Front as well as abroad became the 
nominal function of the Ministry of Information. To this 
end, the Ministry began in the first year of the war to 
argue in favour of a broad-based "Social Survey" for the 
purpose of ascertaining practical and ideological needs of 
Britain's people. Using the Survey, the fundamental goal 
of Britain's survival and Germany's destruction could be 
served by the Ministry through a specific knowledge of what 
the people thought they were fighting for. However, as the 
Commons debated the necessity of this survey, it was clear 
that there was little if any marked concern over general 
public opinion at this stage. Many Members objected 
outright to such a survey as a shameless waste of public 
money, since "this country is perfectly happy", and "was 
never in its history more united than it is now"."
As time went on, however, the unity of fighting 
spirit, which many leaders had taken for granted at the
Paul Addison, Now the War is Over, Cape (London) 1985, p.5.
House of Commons Debates (Hansard), fifth series, vol. 363, col.1515.
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which many leaders had taken for granted at the outset, 
became questionable, when it began to appear in 1940 as if 
the urgently prepared-for German aerial attack would never 
come. It was during this period of "Phoney War" leading to 
Hitler's invasion of Norway that could be seen as the 
essential low-point of British morale generally; not 
because of reaction to German direct attack, as had been 
speculated at the outset of hostilities, but because it 
began to appear as though it might never come. As the 
weeks went by without heavy attack, the public that had 
been urged to prepare for the worst became sceptical as to 
the necessity of the food, lighting, entertainment, and 
other restrictions that had become a daily reality in the 
name of civil defence.^ In addition, the confidence that 
had been inspired by fast mobilisation of ARP, reinforced 
by official statements in the first days of war, had 
contributed to a general attitude that appeared to the 
authorities to resemble indifference.®
This feeling of apathy was still perceived in the 
Spring of 1940, after Hitler had invaded Norway and 
Denmark. Likewise, in the last weeks before Dunkirk, the 
Cabinet was still discussing what could be done at the top 
to "educate public opinion to the reality of the air 
threat", and Home Secretary John Anderson reported to the 
Cabinet that he was "anxious about the apathetic attitude 
displayed by the general public toward civil defence".^ Nor 
was this perceived sense of apathy restricted to the
® O'Brien, p.297.
® Ibid.
War Cabinet Minutes (Public Record Office microfiche, 116 (40)1), 9
May, 1940.
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June, the Cabinet concluded that an instruction from the 
Prime Minister to all departments would have to be issued 
to combat "defeatist talk" that had been reported as 
spreading within the Government.® This instruction, not 
released until July, urged officials "to report, or if 
necessary remove, any officers or officials, who are found 
to be consciously exercising a disturbing or depressing 
influence, and whose talk is calculated to spread alarm and 
despondency".® Apparently, the mood with which officials 
were so concerned was not limited to the general populace.
By the summer of 194 0, however, the Government need 
not have been overly concerned about what active steps 
could be taken to reinforce morale as it related to 
enthusiasm for the war effort. By 18 June, the evacuation 
of Dunkirk followed by the fall of France to an occupying 
German force was enough to rouse the public out of any 
previous indifference. Suddenly Britain stood alone in 
Western Europe, facing German invasion. The unavoidable 
gravity of this fact was certainly sufficient to rekindle 
the united sense of purpose that had waned since the first 
days of the war. As official historian Terence O'Brien has 
observed, "British people had attached themselves 
completely to the war...This was the great transforming 
fact"."
As the reality of war was uniting Britain 
ideologically for the national war effort, legislation was
® War Cabinet Minutes (Public Record Office microfiche, 19(40)10), 2
June, 1940.
®Winston S. Churchill, The Roar of the Lion, Tandem (London) 1969, 
p .158.
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Committee headed by Sir John Gilmour had reported to the 
Government on an inquiry held into Scottish administration. 
The Committee, which investigated the operation and 
organisation of existing Scottish Governmental Departments, 
concluded that due to the practical difficulties presented 
to the Scottish Boards by distance from Whitehall, their 
ability to provide opinion on "technical work" and other 
administrative matters was unnecessarily strained." Their 
recommendations included the setting up of four Departments 
of State; Health, Home (including Fisheries and Prisons), 
Agriculture, and Education, with whom the Scottish 
Secretary of State could confer when departments clashed. 
These would be headquartered at Calton Hill in Edinburgh as 
a bonafide Government Department, supporting the broad 
duties of the Scottish Secretary of State."
The proposals of the Gilmour Committee had their 
Second Reading in the Commons in December of 1938, and were 
enacted in 1939 under the Reorganisation of Offices 
(Scotland) Act. This removal of Scottish administration to 
Edinburgh brought added control of Scottish matters with it 
from London, giving the Secretary of State a Scotland-based 
Department from which he could administrate specific 
duties. In addition, the nominal functions of the Scottish 
Secretary were supplemented by a broad influence over 
Scottish matters generally: "quite apart from his
statutory duties, he has a large..sphere of other duties in 
which he is supposed to represent the Scottish point of
“ George Pottinger, Secretaries of State for Scotland, 1926-76 Scottish 
Academic Press (Edinburgh) 197 9, p . 17.
“ House of Commons Debates, (Hansard), fifth series, vol. 342, col.1842.
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Scottish point of view and to safeguard Scottish 
interests"."
This administrative separation at the outbreak of war 
was not intended to be a move towards Home Rule for 
Scotland, nor did it give the Scottish Office independent 
authority in the sweeping Ministerial decisions that were 
transforming Scotland (and the rest of Britain) into a Home 
Front. The possibility of an eventual transition to post­
war Home Rule was mentioned immediately during the Second 
Reading of the Bill, in spite of a wartime mandate barring 
such debate in the Commons. Thomas Johnston, like several 
others, stated that there was no intention of straying from 
this mandate, yet reiterated in his remarks that the 
legislation did not succeed in giving Scotland the 
democracy that they demanded, and that "things cannot go on 
as they are."" Perhaps mere administrative efficiency- 
building was, as Johnston concluded, "inadequate" to the 
needs of the Scottish nation."
Nevertheless, the Act succeeded in creating for 
Scotland a separate, closed administrative community from 
which practical as well as political conclusions would be 
drawn and supported on matters relating to Scotland. 
Though not an outward recognition of fundamental 
ideological differences, the Act can be perceived as a 
clear acknowledgement of separate practical needs in the 
government of Scottish people as a community. As time went
“ Scottish Home and Health Dept, Correspondence , HH.45.34, taken from 
Ian Levitt, ed. , The Scottish Office- Depression and Reconstruction 
1919-1959 Pillans & Wilson (Edinburgh) 1992, p.99.
“ House of Commons Debates (Hansard), fifth series, vol. 342, col.1858.
“ Ibid, col.1856.
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many of which appeared (or were made to appear) as arising 
directly from the war on the Home Front.
While the political efforts of various Scottish 
leaders succeeded in gaining a degree of administrative 
consolidation for Scotland, another aspect of control over 
Scotland was brought to Edinburgh by the onset of war. The 
administration of Civil Defence, fully in place by August 
of 1939, divided Britain into twelve "Defence Regions", 
each with a Regional Commissioner who acted under Royal 
Warrant of Appointment as overseer for Civil Defence in his 
area." Scotland as a whole comprised a single Defence 
Region, and its first Commissioner was Thomas Johnston, 
followed by the Earl of Rosebery in February of 1941.
The duties of a Regional Commissioner, like those of 
the Secretary of State for Scotland, were broad. He was to 
supervise all Civil Defence arrangements, acting as liaison 
with the Ministry of Home Security, control local 
authorities to ensure that CD directives were being carried 
out, and maintain morale of the general population." This 
regionally-based entity of the Home Office comprised yet 
another separate administrative community. Such a remote 
administration would feel the natural "centrifugal force" 
that, according to the Gilmour Committee had always been 
inherent in Scottish government generally. Namely, 
administration of Scotland was unique simply by being an 
arm of centralised authority reaching four hundred miles 
from London.
The Regional Commissioner was virtually without
O'Brien, p.308.
Pottinger, p. 90.
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The Regional Commissioner was virtually without
official power in the capacity that the Home Front war had
created. However, the decidedly general terms of his
authority were completely variable to the scale of enemy
activity that occurred within his Region. These powers
were outlined in Defence Regulations, which in time of
crisis empowered him to
"issue directions affecting persons in Defence 
Areas..for the purpose of meeting or hindering an 
actual or apprehended attack by the enemy or of 
protecting persons and property from dangers 
involved in any such attack"."
This directive would still be in place by May of 1942, long 
after the primary threat of German invasion or large-scale 
attack had passed."
Clearly, depending on the events that would determine 
"military necessity", the Regional Commissioner was 
anything from a benign overseer of Ministry policy to a 
virtual dictator, in the event of a breakdown of 
communication with London. The fact that this necessity 
never arose in Scotland or any other Defence Region 
throughout the war does not deter from the moral 
responsibility that was borne with the position. On the 
whole, this responsibility was to be London's man in the 
field, seeing to the practical measures in Scotland that 
would help to preserve the lives and minds of the Scottish 
people, as well as helping to ensure support of the war 
effort. This duty to "prepare for the worst and hope for 
the best", as Johnston called it in his memoirs, was on a
® Scottish Home and Health Department, Regional Commissioner's Powers 
Under Defence Regulations, Scottish National Archives, HH.36.14.
“ Ibid,
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local authorities, many of which were not co-operative. In 
Glasgow, which was the most obvious military target in the 
Scottish Region, Johnston found the status of ARP 
preparation to be "woefully inadequate", and relations 
between himself and the Lord Provost Patrick Dollan were 
strained as Johnston pressed the necessity of local 
preparations like evacuation of children, better fire 
prevention and local air raid shelter policy." Johnston 
also used his authority to create five District 
Commissioners for heavily-populated areas, in order to keep 
a close contact of the Scottish Office with public opinion 
and/or the state of morale. By the time Glasgow became the 
target of heavy German attack, however, Johnston had been 
appointed to the Cabinet in London as Secretary of State 
for Scotland. His tenure as Regional Commissioner had 
evidently led to a position well-suited to his ongoing 
attempts of persuasion on behalf of Scotland's needs, and 
it is not likely that he had forgotten the direct 
connection that every aspect of the British Home Front 
seemed to have with the issue of morale.
Graham Walker, Thomas Johnston. Manchester U. Press (Manchester) 1988, 
p. 148 .
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Any historical study of the British Home Front must 
perhaps inevitably include a discussion of the role of 
morale. When considering the political implications and 
uses of the term by British leaders when they attempted to 
assess or influence public opinion, it is immediately 
apparent as a focal concern. Speculation of the effects of 
bombing against heavily populated areas viewed morale 
simply in terms of psychological stamina and willingness of 
the public to carry on under air-raid conditions. As early 
as 1924, studies anticipated (along with heavy physical 
casualties and material damage) a huge breakdown of 
civilian morale. In the first of what would be a series of 
Circulars on the subject, the Home Office issued a warning 
to all Departments that "it would be impossible to 
guarantee immunity from air attack".
Since heavy air attack on civilians was a new factor 
in war, any estimation of its effects, material or 
psychological, was unclear. Because a few raids on London 
in the last war had created an average of 50 casualties per 
ton of bombs dropped, the Air Staff factored the likely 
tonnage that the Luftwaffe would be capable of delivering 
using current technology. The figures were decidedly grim. 
Assuming that the outbreak of total war would bring an all- 
out aerial offensive from Germany, the London area could 
expect something in the vicinity of 8750 people killed or 
wounded in the first 48 hours of the conflict, followed by 
an additional 25 00 every subsequent 24 hours.^ Even in 
1939 , it was generally expected in Whitehall that the
O'Brien, p.58. 
Ibid, p . 16.
47
would take with it some 2 million casualties . throughout the 
country within a few weeks, as the Luftwaffe attempted to 
crush the resolve of the British to carry on.”
Given the dire effects of bombing on the Home Front 
that were expected prior to the outbreak of war, it is 
hardly surprising that the Government perceived a chance 
for mass death and sheer horror to outweigh nationalist 
unity and general civic fortitude. As previously 
mentioned, however, the British leadership had made little 
if any preparation to deal with the psychological effects 
of what would become eight months of "stand-by" for a 
militarised civilian populace.” It was during this period 
of inactivity that civilian morale became an issue for 
discussion and analysis between Government departments and 
MBs, who after establishing it as the "supreme factor" of 
warfare, began what would be an ongoing endeavour to bring 
morale under its centralised control.
The essential problem in controlling or influencing 
civilian morale was one that presented itself from the 
outset of Civil Defence organisation during the inter-war 
period; namely that of its defining characteristics. The 
Ministry of Information, planned in 1935 as a centralised 
Department with the task of maintaining it, was 
supplemented at the height of the Phoney War in May of 194 0 
with the Home Morale Emergency Committee as well as the 
work of the Mass Observation Unit, a social survey group 
that attempted to assess morale throughout the country 
using sociological case-studies.
” Russell Galbraith Without Quarter- A Biography of Tom Johnston 
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It is clear, however, that these organisations were
striving throughout the war to assess and lead what they
could never adequately define in specific terms. The
Ministry of Information and related bodies, whose primary
function concerned morale assessment and maintenance,
pursued this goal through release (and censorship) of
official news as well as public information programmes for
other departments. But this system was decidedly
subjective in practice. In August of 1940, as the
necessity of methodical "morale maintenance" was being
debated in the Commons, the Minister of Information (Duff
Cooper) succeeded only in illustrating the variable nature
of morale in the wide field of public opinion:
The word 'morale'..does not mean the same thing 
as courage. Good morale does not simply mean 
courage, and bad morale does not simply mean 
cowardice. Morale is something much broader than 
that..
Likewise, the co-founder and head of Mass Observation, Tom 
Harrisson, was reportedly "honest enough to confess that it 
is difficult to sift this..evidence without developing a 
certain bias...".” Apparently, the individuals charged with 
the assessment and maintenance of morale could only make 
the vaguest attempts to narrow its description.
Home Front morale was never limited to one working 
definition, but instead was roughly clarified by its 
connection to a broad spectrum of social, economic, 
industrial, and/or political factors in British society. 
Each Government Ministry adopted its own, largely arbitrary 
standard in correspondence and circulars, linked more or
House of Commons Debates (Hansard), fifth series, vol. 363, col.1547. 
Ibid,
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standard in correspondence and circulars, linked more or 
less directly to its perceived function in "running the 
war" at any given time. As a result, the morale issue can 
be seen first and foremost as an indicator of the 
perceptions of individuals or groups who attempted to 
assess and employ it as a pillar of argument. Since morale 
on its most basic level (moral/psychological fortitude in 
wartime) was generally sound throughout Britain, any 
evidence to the contrary could quickly be used to set a 
community apart in an attempt to give a flag of priority in 
London to its problems. This is essentially what made 
public morale in Clydeside a very frequent issue with 
leaders and departments for whom Scottish needs were a 
primary function and concern.
A few weeks before the German attack on Glasgow in 
March of 1941, the Mass Observation Unit conducted a case- 
study of the city in an effort to ascertain morale and the 
general state of public opinion. Regarding economic 
conditions in the city, they concluded that in the absence 
of heavy German attack, Glasgow was benefiting greatly from 
the war:
...it must always be remembered that in relation 
to the pre-war situation Glasgow is now a 
thriving and prosperous place, with better 
economic opportunities than for a great many 
years...”
Of course, the demand for labour in munitions and 
shipbuilding brought on by the onset of war was a boom to 
the Scottish economy, which had suffered greatly between 
the wars. By comparison, 133 factory closures between 1932
Mass Observation, "Preliminary Report on Morale in Glasgow' 
(Strathclyde Regional Archives, AGN.2252).
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had seen in the same period.” By the outbreak of war, when 
rearmament was in full swing, the Clyde shipyards were 
producing some 400,000 tons of shipping per year, and 
unemployment was down to 1.6% from an average of 14% during 
the 1920s.” Clearly, at least on an economic/industrial 
level, the war had brought with it a measure of prosperity 
to Scotland.
Of course, the high demand for labour and war 
materials had solved (at least temporarily) the 
unemployment problem that had plagued Scotland during the 
inter-war period. However, this wave of prosperity brought 
on by the war acted to mask many discontents that lingered 
on in spite of the reinforced British national unity that 
had allegedly been created by the war effort. If adherence 
to Defence Regulations could serve Whitehall as a measuring 
stick for the general sacrifices that individuals were 
willing to make toward the British war effort, then the 
ideological unity of Scotland to the British cause of war 
can be seen as questionable. An example from the 
industrial sector, which perhaps should have alarmed 
Ministers and MPs, was the population-adjusted number of 
prosecutions in Scotland under Defence Regulation 2B, which 
prohibited industrial sabotage as an impediment to the war 
effort. These numbered four and a half times more in the 
Scottish Region than in England and Wales combined for the 
same period ( 1939-'44), yet did not get more than passing 
mention in Scottish Office correspondence.”
fiadtëwsMaHDmeTkBdBHèè.lëh5’o£aSeetBEDd^cEèBi^utilnd^ïioEld!5B^cè9ELê9u|)aË2on 2B 
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correspondence.”
A matter of greater concern to the Mass Observation 
Unit was the number of strikes that were occurring in the 
Glasgow area at the time of their study. This was also an 
infringement of Defence Regulations, and thus subject to 
prosecution. The Government had deemed strikes of any kind 
to be a clear indication of weak or poor morale, but 
especially in war work. Stoppage in vital war industry
(such as shipbuilding) naturally meant big trouble for the 
war effort. However, the high demand for labour afforded 
workers the opportunity for leverage in improving 
conditions for themselves and for the future. This was
certainly not lost on Glaswegian workers, as the number of 
strikes shows.
The fact that workers in the Glasgow area could (and
did) strike with relative impunity displays a pragmatic
adoption of the civic unity that was supposedly prevalent
throughout Britain. The ideology of sacrifice and
individual effort in wartime was adopted in Scotland as
elsewhere, but when it appeared as though workers on the
Clyde were striving to achieve aims of their own as well,
this was construed by Mass Observation and others as a sign
of poor morale:
There is less interest in the course of the 
war... Clydeside workers are..having a war of 
their own, and ..they cannot forget the numerous 
battles of the past thirty years, and cannot 
overcome the bitter memory of industrial 
insecurity in the past ten years...”
Evidently, the ideology of discipline and willing sacrifice
Scottish Home and Health, Cases Prosecuted Under Defence Regulation 2B 
(Sabotage), Scottish National Archives, HE.50.35.
” Mass Observation (Strathclyde Regional Archives) AGN.2252.
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the Clyde. The basis in fact of specifically Scottish
stakes in the war effort is vague, but there is little
doubt that the tradition of labour unrest and experiences
of Glasgow in the 1920s and 30s were present in the minds
of many individuals who were making morale assessments in
1941. Since morale was essentially an undefinable term
that was being given a direct link to the analysis of
wartime public opinion generally, even relatively isolated
signs of discontent such as those emanating from industry
were enough to create a perception of questionable morale
in the entire Scottish Region. This perception, based on
incidents that were generally as frequent south of the
border, nevertheless became support for assumptions that
Scotland's "national identity" on the Home Front was worth
close scrutiny.
The apparent apathy of many Glaswegians toward the
national war effort, which so concerned the Mass
Observation Unit, was cited as being mainly due to the lack
of heavy German air attack, but the surveyors were also
quick to set it apart from other "quiet" areas:
The most striking distinction between Glasgow and 
previous areas studied is the apparent lack of 
interest in much of what is going on in the war, 
and the very low degree of excitement or 
enthusiasm about war issues among the mass of the 
people. The war still seems to be locked upon 
here as largely a personal matter and an economic 
affair...”
From the impression that Mass Observation was getting 
during its study, it seemed that the Glasgow area was not 
subscribing fully to the ideology of the British war 
effort, since they did not even seem to think of themselves
Mass Observation (Strathclyde Regional Archives) AGN.2252.
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directly involved. In spite of the wartime strain of 
nationalism that mandated complete involvement in the war, 
workers on the Clyde concerned themselves with other 
matters that should have been peripheral at best under the 
circumstances. This impression was partly due to the fact 
that only 3% of overheard conversations in pubs related to 
the war, which to Mass Observation showed that the war was 
not being taken into every aspect of social life as it had 
been elsewhere.” Although apathy or indifference toward 
ARP and civil defence from a lack of German attack was 
nothing new by 1941, it was considered a matter for concern 
after Britain had borne witness to the heavy raids on 
London from November of 1940.
Nor was there much expectation of heavy raids in the 
Glasgow area on the eve of the "Clydeside Blitz" that would 
strike the city on 13-14 March. According to a Mass 
Observation poll, only 30% of individuals interviewed in 
the Glasgow area expected heavy raids at all, and less than 
half that number expected them to occur anytime within the 
following two months”. This was not the kind of confidence 
that the Government wanted to encourage in the civil 
population, and as the report recommended, "..If we are 
concerned with leading morale in Glasgow we should be very 
disturbed at seeing so many people living in a fool's 
paradise
Aside from the normal (though "alarming") apathy that 
was cited as a result of the relative peace that the city 
of Glasgow had enjoyed since the outbreak of war. Mass
" Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Glasgow had enjoyed since the outbreak of war. Mass
Observation also attributed this poor level of enthusiasm
to something that fell along traditional national lines:
This lack of close identification with the 
English war is clearly a dangerous tension, and 
one which might easily continue to develop, and 
is indeed in line with much unformulated and 
largely unconscious Scottish thinking about the 
direction of unity and loyalty.”
The individuals who investigated Glasgow for the purpose of 
the morale study, basing their terms on loyalty and unity 
toward the British (though the word 'English' seemed to 
suffice) war effort, found that there existed a complacency 
that in London had wrought "nearly disastrous" consequences 
a year previously. Mass Observation's conclusion that 
Scotland required a "stimulus for unity" contributed 
greatly to the assertions that were being made in 
Whitehall; that Scotland's contribution to the war effort 
would require morale measures going beyond those employed 
in the rest of Britain.
Ibid.
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If the root cause of Glasgow's apathy toward the 
progress of war in early 1941 was a lack of heavy German 
bombardment, the remedy was on its way. After failing to 
quell the general resolve of the British with the Blitz on 
the capital (primarily between July-October, 1940), the
Germans shifted their bombing concentration from London to 
the provincial port cities. With successive night raids on 
cities like Manchester, Portsmouth, Liverpool, and Glasgow, 
the Germans began an attempt to knock out what formed the 
backbone of British industry as well as its vital access to 
Atlantic shipping.” On the night of 13-14 March, 
approximately 236 Luftwaffe aircraft bombed the Clydeside 
area of Glasgow, returning the following night.to inflict 
further damage. Clydebank suffered most, however, due 
primarily to the success of the Luftwaffe in starting 
"Pathfinder" fires in the area at which the majority of the 
bombs were dropped on the second night of the attack.” 
While most of the city escaped heavy material damage, 
Clydebank experienced some of the most devastating of the 
entire war in Britain. Out of 11, 945 houses in the area, 
76% were destroyed or made uninhabitable, some 35,000 
people were rendered homeless, and only 7 houses were left 
undamaged. ”
Although morale was judged before the Glasgow Blitz in 
relation to the "traditional disunity" and apathy of the 
general populace to the ideology of the Home Front, it was 
assessed after the raid chiefly according to the ARP
O'Brien, p.412.
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57
and behaviour of the public during the immediate recovery 
period. In this respect, the Glasgow area seemed to hold 
up very well to the raids, as shown by the fortnightly 
reports of Chief Constables in the Scottish Defence Region, 
which concluded that the public deserved "universal 
commendation" for the calm that prevailed throughout the 
attack.The raids also were reported to have "crystallised 
resolve" of the general public toward preparations for air 
attack such as evacuation plans, and industrial unrest in 
many areas was quelled considerably. This turnaround is 
exhibited by John Brown's Shipbuilders Clydebank, which had 
been the epicentre of a widespread apprentices' strike in 
the weeks preceding the blitz. Only a fortnight after most 
workers in the area had been rendered homeless and 
transport to the yard totally disrupted, the management 
reported worker absenteeism of a mere 2 0 percent/”
Clearly there was no fundamental difference in the 
direct reaction of a Scottish public to heavy air raids 
from that of their counterparts in the South. One indirect 
reaction of the public in Glasgow that made its way down to 
Whitehall in the weeks following the attack was the concern 
of local and regional leaders over the release of casualty 
figures for the area. After the raid. Civil Defence 
administrators had reported casualty levels as "relatively 
light", which was perceived by readers as a downplayed 
report.” When local officials learned of this, they decided
Home Office Correspondence, 'Police Instructions to Regional Public 
Reactions to Air Raids’ (Public Record Office, HO.45.25010).
” Glasgow District Civil Defence, Circulars (Scottish National Archives, 
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to breach Civil Defence policy and release specific figures 
in an effort to allay any distrust of official information. 
Unfortunately, the number of 500 killed was also a serious 
underestimate, and Chief Constable's Morale Reports for the 
Region began to focus on "adverse comment" and scepticism 
toward official communiqués.”
The beginning of April saw the issue raised in the 
Commons by several Scottish MPs, including James Maxton, 
George Buchanan, and John McGovern, who referred to public 
reaction in the area as resentful, with the spread of wild 
rumours resulting from disillusionment with the local 
information authorities” . As a result of this pressure the 
Cabinet agreed to release yet another figure, numbering the 
dead at 1, 040, "in order to satisfy public opinion of the 
reliability of official figures".” Naturally, the German 
attack on Clydeside and the issue of casualty figures 
brought the Scottish Region into the fore (at least 
temporarily) regarding discussion on Civil Defence policy.
Aside from the physical and psychological threats to 
Scottish morale presented by bombing itself, the Government 
also concerned itself during the war with organisations in 
Scotland whose ideology did not seem compatible with that 
of the unified British Home Front. Perhaps most obvious of 
these groups was the Scottish Nationalist Party, formed in 
the mid-19 2 0s by Roland Muirhead after he became 
disillusioned with Labour's Home Rule Movement. Thomas 
Johnston had pointed out in the Commons in 1938 that the
Public Record Office, HO.45.25010.
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Johnston had pointed out in the Commons in 1938 that the 
Scottish Nationalists were certainly a force to be reckoned 
with :
"..I say that it is up to the Secretary of State 
for Scotland, it is up to us, it is up to Members 
of all parties, while there is yet time, and
before a new Sinn Fein movement occurs on our 
northern frontier..to make democracy efficient 
and to make it work"
Clearly, a group whose purpose was to win independence of
Scotland from the London-based government presented a case
of conflicting ideals, especially at a time when the
possibilities of nationalist movements were making
themselves fairly plain throughout Europe. If nationalism
is, as one theorist has suggested, the most powerful
ideological force in the post-Reformation world, any
alternative to British nationalism on the Home Front was a
potential threat.”
By 1939 , however, any perception of the SNP as a
serious threat to unity of Scots with the war effort was
clearly exaggerated. Membership of the Party had gone down
to 2, 000 from 10,000 just five years previously, and this
was compounded by serious financial trouble; at the
outbreak of war they had an overdraft of 800 pounds.” In
addition, the Party had seen a fair degree of internal
strife, much of it resulting from the dilemma over what
would be the best position for the Party to take in the
impending war in Europe.” Though opposed to Fascism, the
Nationalists had a traditional belief that the British
Government had no right to take Scotland into war without 
” Webb, p.2.
” Ibid, p.61.
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the Scottish people.” This policy was subjected to almost 
continuous revision until the outbreak of war and 
conscription, by which time it stated Home Rule as a 
condition of Scottish participation in the war.
Unfortunately for the SNP, by this time the statement had 
no electoral impact.
Considering the hard times that had befallen the 
Scottish Nationalist Party by the outbreak of war, it is 
not surprising that it had not called much attention to 
itself as a significant influence on public opinion. 
However, there was some threat perceived to the British war 
effort from Scottish nationalism as an ideology. The 
Germans, for example, supplemented their radio propaganda 
to Britain with "Radio Caledonia", a programme aimed 
specifically at Scotland for the purpose of attempting to 
arouse nationalist sentiment in opposition to the war.
Although the Government never took any direct steps to 
repress groups that professed Scottish nationalist 
sentiment, they were not left completely unscrutinised. 
The homes of 17 individuals involved in various Scottish 
Home Rule movements were searched by the police in May of 
1941, and 11 were actually detained for questioning.When 
James Maxton came before the House of Commons two weeks 
later to ask for what reason, aside from involvement in 
Scottish Home Rule Association, the men had been searched 
and detained, he was told by the Secretary of State for 
Scotland (Tom Johnston) that the warrants had been issued 
under Defence Regulation 88A, addressing "preparation or
Ibid, p.57.
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88A, addressing "preparation, or instigation of acts 
prejudicial to the public safety and the defence of the 
realm".Although this appears (as was implied by Maxton) 
to be selective repression of political enemies under the 
umbrella of Defence Regulations, the authorities only 
prosecuted one of the men under this charge, who was given 
a £20 fine. Considering that military rifles, bayonets, 
and live ammunition were found in his possession, this 
punishment was considerably light.
Aside from one individual who seemed prepared for 
armed rebellion, Scottish nationalism as an ideology in 
itself did not affect much popular opposition to conditions 
on the Home Front, nor would it spread much demand for Home 
Rule once the war was over. The specifically "Scottish 
identity" on which it depended was not directly relevant to
politics on the Home Front. Being largely culturally-
based, the "Scottish identity" seems to have co-existed in 
most respects with the British context of the war. It was 
this co-existence that could be brought to the level of 
conflict by Johnston and others whenever British Home-Front 
politics seemed to be deprioritising or ignoring Scottish 
social or cultural interests.
Perhaps of greater concern to Mass Observation and the 
centralised government with regard to opposition groups in 
Scotland was the Communist Party. The Communists, in
accordance with the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact 
existing prior to Germany's Eastern Front, had taken a
position of 'revolutionary defeatism'. They also voiced 
open opposition to the war in their Party newspaper, the 
" Ibid.
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to the war in their Party newspaper, the Daily Worker, 
which was boasting weekly sales of up to 362,000 in 1940.” 
The War Cabinet had considered suppression of the 
publication under Defence Regulation 2D (publishing matter 
intended to foment opposition to the war), but decided 
against it. Not only would it serve to agitate industrial 
workers, but there "were a number of other newspapers which 
were as worthy of drastic action as the Daily Worker" . ” 
This decision was reconsidered however, and the ban was 
administered in January of 1941. In addition to protesting 
the ban of the Worker, the Party continued relatively 
unmolested in its other activities, mainly calling for 
social reform on the Home Front, provision of better 
shelters and adequate control of food prices. Ironically, 
it was this programme that probably should have concerned 
the War Cabinet most, as the general population was much 
more likely to side with the Communist Party on such 
matters affecting Home Front life than with any direct 
anti-war propaganda.
Ongoing concern (and surveillance) over the presence 
of Communist ideology in Britain inevitably turned its 
attention to the Glasgow area as one that was perhaps 
particularly susceptible to CP-instilled discontent. After 
all, the Clydeside area had a long tradition of Socialist 
agitation; it is likely that many remembered the last war, 
when tanks and troops were sent into George Square in 
Glasgow's City Centre to suppress a demonstration of
 ^ Paul Addison, Churchill on the Home Front 1900-1955 Jonathan Cape 
(London) 1992, p.343.
War Cabinet Minutes (Public Record Office microfiche, 193(40)2), 4 
July, 1940.
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of a series of events in the past thirty years that had 
earned for the general area the name of "Red Clydeside". 
Mass Observation even went so far as to attribute a certain 
amount of Communist influence to apathy toward air attack, 
stating that "one of the reasons frequently given for not 
expecting heavy raids was that the Germans believe 
revolution will develop so long as bombs don't stir up the 
people".” Police in the area kept close watch on Communist 
activities, as is clearly revealed in Police Intelligence 
Reports from the Scottish Region, but action was never 
taken. By the time of the Blitz on Clydeside, Constables 
could report that their meetings showed "no sign of 
attracting any greater degree of public interest", and 
aside from the increased opportunity created by the bombing 
for the Party to "create difficulty" over fire-fighting 
arrangements and the food situation, there was little if 
any significant public disorder directly connected to the 
Communists.”
Although the Communist Party did not create a 
significant threat in and of itself to the war effort 
(particularly after the ban of their press), there was a 
strong perception of its influence in the periodic labour 
unrest in Glasgow that was the focal concern of Mass 
Observation's morale report in early 1941. Strikes, as 
previously mentioned, were certainly not a figment of MO's 
imagination according to local ARP records. Many of these, 
such as an apprentices' strike during that year, had become 
widespread in engineering and shipbuilding areas throughout
Mass Observation (Strathclyde Regional Archives, AGN.2252) 
Public Record Office, HO.45.25010.
6 4
Glasgow and Edinburgh. Such strikes were apparently
thought by the public to be the result of exploitation by
"outside agitators", though the Communist Party was not
mentioned by name.”
As in the case of the various other forces that were
seen to be at work in areas of Scotland, the actual threat
of the Communist Party or industrial unrest in general was
at worst a case of co-existence with what was a fairly
stable war effort. However, what appeared to be a threat
to observers was enough to create a mind set that magnified
incidents and applied them directly to a subjective,
British ideal of morale and national unity. When working-
class Scots appeared to be placing their own interests over
those mandated by shared nationalism and wartime solidarity
with the rest of Britain, morale was perceived as
threatened. Actions contrary to the prescribed conduct of
the Home Front, like strikes, when shown to co-exist with
"subversive" Home Front ideologies like Communism,
immediately became serious considerations. Even Mass
Observation, in an attempt to summarise the lack of
"direction and loyalty" on Clydeside, acknowledged
Communism as a secondary factor:
..The antagonisms which are inevitable under war 
conditions, which should properly be directed 
towards the enemy, have not here been so 
directed.,.Rather, they have gradually directed 
themselves along the well-established Clydeside 
line, which long pre-dates the Communist Party, 
i.e. of worker vs. boss, and this direction to 
antagonism is in itself the..antithesis of good 
morale (though it might be good morale from a 
revolutionary point of view I)
Public Record Office, HO.45.25010.
Mass Observation (Strathclyde Regional Archives) AGN.2 252.
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Clearly then, the findings of Mass Observation served to 
reinforce much of the concern in Whitehall that existed 
over Scottish public opinion and what was serving to shape 
it. Government action (when taken) was slight, especially 
considering the possibilities open to them through Defence 
Regulations. Nevertheless, the perception of mere 
potential was enough to provide an added pillar in 
virtually any sociopolitical argument regarding Scotland, 
given the broad view that the wartime Government had 
accepted of its functions. Actual threats to unity and 
morale of communities may have preceded the use of their 
possible ramifications as political leverage, but only in a 
decidedly benign form.
Along with the variety of opposing ideologies that 
existed domestically within Scotland and Britain as a 
whole, the Home Front was subjected to that of the German 
enemy through radio broadcasts aimed at Great Britain. 
These broadcasts, which began in the 1930s under a service 
known as the New British Broadcasting Service (NBBS), were 
best known for the talks given by "Lord Haw-Haw", whose 
broadcasts were made to appear as if they were coming from 
within Britain. The programmes of Lord Haw-Haw were 
supplemented in 1940 with Radio Caledonia, a service aimed 
specifically at the Scottish Region for the purpose of 
arousing nationalist sentiment, as well as Welsh Freedom, 
Workers' Challenge, and Christian Peace Movement stations.” 
By January of 1940, a BBC listeners' poll revealed that 33%
of the public in Britain were tuning in to the German
Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War 1939-45 Routledge (London) 1979, 
p . 139.
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The fact that people of Britain were regularly tuning
in to listen to enemy radio broadcasts in 1940 is probably
more a result of the strict censorship of news that was
being upheld by the Ministry of Information and the BBC at
the time, as well as the lack of activity on the Home Front
generally. Nevertheless, the German broadcasts were given
surprisingly little attention by the Government. When the
prospect of monitoring the number of people listening to
the broadcasts was mentioned in the Commons in August of
1940, it was added that they were not expected to do any
harm.” The Ministry of Information, accepting a policy of
striving to discourage rather than prohibit listening,
arranged with the BBC the simultaneous broadcast of talks
by JB Priestly as a more attractive alternative.”
By early 1941, the number of people listening to
German radio was reported to have decreased considerably,
and was thought to be no threat to general morale by many
in Whitehall. The Mass Observation Unit, meanwhile, was
urging for more active monitoring and prevention of the
"Haw-Haw habit" amongst the public of Glasgow:
There is nothing..to justify the complacency so 
often shown in official circles, about the 
present unimportance of Haw-Haw. A thing is not 
unimportant because it is not obvious; and things
can go on and simmer along the mass of the public
without ever becoming obvious to leaders...”
This claim by Mass Observation would be refuted by Police 
Intelligence immediately following the German attack on 
Glasgow, describing the effect of the broadcasts as
House of Commons Debates (Hansard), fifth series, vol. 363, col.1528. 
Ibid, col.768.
Mass Observation, AGN.2252.
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"negligible"”. One issue raised by Mass Observation, which 
was perhaps of greater concern, was their claim resting 
most of the blame for Scottish Haw-Haw listening onto the 
BBC, as "the Home programme is largely unsuitable for the 
mass public, who therefore were forced to find alternative 
programmes..."” Apparently, the cultural distinction of the 
Scottish people lent an added dimension to what was a 
common problem on the Home Front. As will be discussed 
later, this distinction was commonly made by Scottish 
leaders and others, who continually claimed that British 
broadcasting propaganda, rather than the wartime 
Government, had failed to appeal to Scottish needs and/or 
tastes.
Considering the perceived threats to the direction of 
Scottish 'unity and loyalty' that were of periodic concern 
to the Government throughout the war, it is apparent that 
these threats were never brought beyond the realm of 
potential, yet the image of a danger was enough to be of 
political use. Perhaps no Scottish leader had kept that 
fact in mind as firmly as Thomas Johnston, When he was 
offered the appointment of Secretary of State by Winston 
Churchill in 1941, based partly on the skill of his 
administration as Regional CD Commissioner, Johnston wasted 
no time. He accepted the position, but only on the grounds 
that he be allowed to form a 'Scottish Council of State' so 
that matters affecting Scotland could be discussed without 
interference from Government Departments or 'partisan
political strife'.” In addition, the Prime Minister was to
“ PublicRecord O f f i c e , H O . 45.25010.
Ibid.
Galbraith, p. 238 .
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the Council made unanimously. His use of Committees 
looking into various aspects of industry, health, and 
education allowed him to investigate and present Scottish 
needs with the minimum of outside interference, such that 
in retrospect, he could claim that "we had got Scotland's 
wishes and opinions respected and listened to, as they had 
never been ..since the Union".”
The emergence of war had not only brought with it an 
expansion of the focus of Government over all aspects of 
British society, but also a relaxation of party politics, 
forcing many interests to assume a low priority in 
discussion and policy-making. It was in these matters that 
the issue of Scottish morale and public opinion generally 
could be used by Johnston as well as others to establish 
cause for immediate consideration. The unique position of 
Scotland as a culturally separate nation in the United 
Kingdom made moral and psychological unity with the rest of 
the Home Front seem more difficult to maintain, and more 
likely to be compromised, than in other areas of Britain. 
The recognised cultural and social identity of the Scottish 
nation, when existing alongside perceived threats to the 
dominance of wartime nationalism in the British context, 
quickly brought legitimacy, if not action, onto problems 
that affected the Scottish people.
Ibid, p.236.
Part II
The War of Ideas and "The Eyes of the Londoner' 
Propaganda and Specialised Ideological Needs
on
The British Home Front
Chapter 5-
Development of the Broadcasting Medium and the Rise of the
BBC as Propagandist
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The nature of total war on the British Home Front in 
1939 required a new emphasis on what had loosely become known 
as civilian morale; a broads all-inclusive term that 
encapsulated the collective strength, both physical and 
psychological, of the British populace. with morale 
maintenance on the Home Front as a fundamental priority for 
the Government, so too came a new emphasis on the means by 
which the ideology of Home Front civic unity could be 
actively reinforced. Wartime propaganda, a form of 
communication borne of the need for immediate stimulation and 
action on the part of the British public, was an integral 
part of the process of morale maintenance.
The Government and Ministry of Information employed all 
available means of communication in its efforts to instill 
throughout Britain the resolve that was necessary to emerge 
victorious from a conflict that would be widely referred to 
as "a war of ideas". In this arena, perhaps the most 
powerful weapon would be that of broadcasting. The British 
Broadcasting Corporation, holding a monopoly over this 
relatively new and powerful medium of propaganda, managed to 
retain a unique degree of creative and administrative 
distance from the Wartime Government that was not seen in any 
other facet of "morale maintenance" overseen by Whitehall. 
In spite of earlier plans to place broadcasting entirely in 
the hands of the Government, the BBC was given a relatively 
free hand to provide the kind of morale maintenance that the 
Ministry of Information strived to define and administer. 
However, the factors contributing to effective radio 
propaganda in wartime, like the issue of morale itself, were 
subject to varied interpretation, making broadcasting a
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propaganda in wartime, like the issue of morale itself, were 
subject to varied interpretation, making broadcasting a 
factor in virtually every other issue facing Home Front 
Britain. The independence of the BBC from Whitehall, though 
allowing the BBC to appear as an objective entity acting on 
behalf of the listener's needs, also opened the door for 
criticism of its shortcomings, from within the Commons as 
well as the British public, when it appeared as if certain 
listeners' needs were being ignored. Perhaps the most vocal 
of such criticism came from the Scottish Region, where 
different traditions, culture, and history made the case for 
a separate propaganda programme seem unavoidable. The 
unwillingness of the BBC and Government to meet the 
acknowledged need for a separate Scottish programme revealed 
the practical limits of wartime radio as a means of 
propaganda. More importantly, however, it also revealed the 
limitations of the morale issue as a means for gaining social 
and political concessions for the Scottish nation.
Aside from the practical aspects of Home Front morale 
discussed previously, the policy for maintenance of Home 
Front national unity in Scotland, as well as Britain in 
general, was largely an issue of propaganda; that is, 
information and ways in which it was communicated between 
individuals and groups on the Home Front, After all, in "a 
war of ideas", this (along with morale) was given a new level 
of significance as a factor in warfare. Of course, 
propaganda as a form of communication was nothing new at the 
outset of war with Germany in 1939. However, the wholesale 
militarisation of entire societies for direct involvement in 
the course of war, as well as the new medium of broadcasting,
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militarisation of entire societies for direct involvement in 
the course of war, as well as the new medium of broadcasting, 
brought propaganda (and its uses) prominence as a focal 
concern.
On its most basic level, propaganda in war (as 
elsewhere) is merely a form of communication, taking place as 
a means by which individuals and groups come to understand 
their environment. Like other forms of communication, 
propaganda serves to increase understanding of the 
environment by abstracting and thus simplifying. Generalised 
stereotypes are held by individuals as a means to interpret 
reality, and when various individual interpretations 
conflict, then further communication must take place in order 
to reach understanding. It is at this primary level of
abstraction, which carries inherent risk of
oversimplification, that propaganda is rendered effective or 
ineffective. As one theorist of propaganda has observed, the 
basic assumptions with which individuals interpret their 
environment, being based largely on emotions, are 
"impregnated with values".^ Clearly, the people of Scotland 
shared many such values and stereotypes with the rest of 
Britain. Otherwise, the centralised propaganda of the Mol 
and the BBC would have been completely alien to them, rather 
than simply inadequate. Since Scotland represented a 
separate culture within Britain, however, there were times 
when differences in socially-held values could render 
propaganda ineffective or in some way lacking to the Scottish 
audience. The National Programme of the BBC would become a
 ^ Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War 1939-45. Routledge (London) 1979, 
p.419.
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audience. The National Programme of the BBC would become a 
prominent example of this trend.
Effective propaganda succeeds in maintaining and 
strengthening the bond of communication between the 
government and its people. When people seek information to 
further understanding, they will invariably seek it from 
trusted sources, allowing the success of the communication to 
be analysed in terms of the degree of uncertainty that is 
removed by it. The exchange of information between "trusted 
source" and individual is ideally a neutral one, promoting 
mutual understanding. Since no individual has the time or 
inclination to verify all of the information given, however, 
less proof is needed by the source as confidence is 
established.^ Of course, if the information given is 
disputed, then the bond of mutual understanding is 
compromised. This was especially true at the outset of the 
Second World War, as full-scale mobilisation and civilian 
bombing not only created widespread uncertainty among the 
general population as to the future of life as they knew it, 
but also a completely altered daily environment. The 
interdependency created between British society and its 
leadership was practical in terms of the collective war 
effort, but primarily ideological, as confidence in the unity 
and loyalty of Britain had to be established and maintained 
in order for any action to take place. ^ This helps to clarify 
the Government's perception of Glasgow in 1941 as an area 
that perhaps needed special attention. If desired action did
 ^ Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, Sage 
(London) 1976, p. 34.
 ^ Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind- War Propaganda from the 
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that perhaps needed special attention. If desired action did 
not take place within Scotland, be it faithful industrial 
work or war conversations in pubs, then it was presumed that 
the source of the problem was ideology and morale.
This immediate need for action over understanding forms 
the essential distinguishing characteristic separating 
propaganda from other means of communication, and makes it 
one of the most frequently used in wartime.^ In war, the
primary goal for a nation's leaders is to persuade people to 
fight, but unlike persuasion, propaganda solicits this action 
without the use of rational argument, since the desired 
action (or inaction) must be achieved before such an argument 
can be formed.^ Whether propaganda solicits specific action 
(agitative) or is aimed at rendering its audience passive and 
accepting of their environment (integrative), it must reach 
the desired effect without being widely disputed by its 
audience. Therefore, the most successful methods of 
propaganda are those that closely resemble mutually 
interactive and beneficial communication,® Whether the 
Scottish public on the Home Front was being subjected to a 
programme of propaganda or persuasion, the overall success of 
the methods used would be apparent by 1945.
As propaganda and persuasion are forms of communication
between society and its leaders, then use of the mass media
is by definition inherent in the transaction. After all, for
information to pass from a source to an audience, it must
have a medium, which automatically shapes the content of the
message being sent. This varied content is based, according 
' Ibid.
 ^ Jowett and O ’Donnell, p.13.
® Jowett and O'Donnell, p.34
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message being sent. This varied content is based, according
to one scholar of media theory, on the level of "sensual
involvement" that is required by the audience in receiving
the information.’ A high level of sensual involvement for
example, defines a 'hot' medium, while a 'cool' medium
elicits specific or limited sensory involvement. By this
qualification, perhaps the strongest of all media is that of
the spoken word.® Its emphasis on the oratory and its
tendency to heighten visual power traditionally makes it a
staple medium for propaganda and/or persuasion. By 1939, the
development of broadcasting had amplified the role of the
spoken word to new dimensions. This would be affirmed by
Peter Eckersley, former Chief Engineer of the BBC, in 1941:
Broadcasting is a very powerful medium of
propaganda. It is oracular and yet friendly. It 
is not what is said that influences its 
listeners...Political beliefs need not be imposed: 
they can be made to grow out of men's minds by 
suggestion..,The BBC exalts the value of compromise 
and escapism by not letting the loudspeaker say 
anything exceptional, thus implying that it is
better not to let anything exceptional be said...®
By the time Eckersley made this matter-of-fact 
assessment of the development of broadcasting in the prewar 
period, it was apparent that unlike the Ministry of 
Information and other Government bodies created for morale- 
maintenance, the British Broadcasting Corporation had had 
long experience as an agent of propaganda and persuasion at 
national, regional, and local levels by 1939.
Unlike most other aspects of Home Front, Government
’ Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, Routledge (London) 1964, p.78.
® Ibid.
® Peter Eckersley, The Power Behind the Microphone, Cape (London) 1941, 
p .155.
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control of the BBC did not begin with mobilisation for war. 
When the British Broadcasting Company was founded in 1922, 
broadcasting was already under State regulation according to 
the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1904 , which gave the Post- 
Master General ministerial responsibility for regulation of 
all transmitters and receivers in Britain. At this time, the 
Government's role was merely to act as overseer of a cartel 
of companies (including Marconi) that produced and sold 
receivers to a small market of enthusiasts, who paid an 
annual license fee of 10 shillings to the Post Office for the 
service.
In 1927 the British Broadcasting Company became the 
British Broadcasting Corporation, after being granted a 
complete monopoly over transmitter facilities throughout the 
country. From that point on, the BBC would have complete 
power to select programming according to its own perceptions 
of the listening needs of the public. Though they still 
answered to the Government through the Post-Master General, 
the BBC had essentially become a separate entity 
administratively. More importantly, they were independent 
creatively as well, and this precedent would allow the BBC to 
avoid being overwhelmed when wartime Government control 
increased in virtually every other sphere of British society.
In 1935 a Broadcasting Committee report concluded that 
due to "a high and certainly unforeseen degree of educative 
and cultural importance" that had developed in the medium, 
there had arisen a need for more articulate ministerial
Paddy Scannell and David Cardiff, A Social History of British 
Broadcasting, Vol.l, Basil Blackwell (Oxford) 1991, p.5.
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representation of the BBC.“ It was suggested that, although 
the Post-Master General should remain in control of "the 
technical side" of broadcasting, "the cultural side..should 
be transferred to a Cabinet Minister in the House of Commons, 
preferably a senior member of the Government, and free from 
heavy departmental responsibilities".^^ It was becoming 
apparent to Whitehall that their primary concern with the BBC 
and its functions should not merely be a matter of revenue 
and infrastructure, but also one that could allow them to 
provide articulate input as to content of the medium.
As Director-General of the BBC, John Reith personified 
the BBC's monopoly of broadcasting with the large measure of 
personal control he wielded over all levels of the 
Corporation's decision-making. The national programme (in 
Scotland and elsewhere) had been supplemented in 1932 with 
Regional broadcasts, in order to cater to specialised 
interests. Within BBC administration, however, this did not 
mean autonomy for Scotland in the area of broadcasting; 
although the popularity of radio had spread since its 
foundation, the staff was still small enough for Reith to be 
able to hand-pick announcers and monitor their performances 
in the Regions as well as in London.“
In addition to concerns over how best to interact with 
the BBC, the Government was by 1935 beginning to speculate on 
the possibility of involvement in another European war, and 
the potential for broadcasting as a means by which to 
influence public opinion was becoming a focal concern of
“ Ministry of Information Correspondence, "Broadcasting in Time War" 
(Public Record Office- INF.1.362).
'"Ibid.
“ Briggs, The BBC- The First 50 Years, p.29.
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influence public opinion was becoming a focal concern of
those who were beginning to make preparations for war.
However, the practical measures that were being drawn up for
Civil Defence were given priority. With the danger presented
by radio signals as a direction-finder for enemy aircraft,
the essential question was not the content of the medium
itself or how best to serve specialised listener needs, but
whether civilian broadcasting of any kind could be allowed to
continue in the event of war.^ In weighing the options,
Reith and the rest of the Broadcasting Committee were quick
to assert that
..the problem seemed to resolve itself into 
offsetting the dangers..the advantages, from the 
point of view of morale, which would result from 
the broadcasting of warnings, official 
announcements, and other features.’®
Clearly, the BBC was well aware of the ideological role that 
it could fill for a society engaged in total war.
In spite of the possibility of being taken off the air 
completely in the event of war, plans were made by 19 3 8 to 
provide a national programme at minimum risk to Civil 
Defence. At the outbreak of hostilities, the transmitters 
throughout Britain would be "synchronised" to one of two 
possible wavelengths, all broadcasting the same national 
programme so as to avoid the problem of enemy direction- 
finding. Of course, this effectively put an end to plans for 
increased decentralization and control given to Regional 
broadcasting, in Scotland as elsewhere.’®
The centralised administration of the BBC would undergo
Public Record Office, INF.1.362. 
Ibid.
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The centralised administration of the BBC would undergo 
some changes as well. If war became imminent, the "non­
technical" powers of the Post-Master General would be 
transferred to the Ministry of Information, who would have 
the authority to prescribe broadcasting hours, veto any 
programme matter, and prescribe conditions for the BBC's 
programming.” In addition, the BBC Board of Governors would 
be completely dismantled, leaving the Director-General and 
his Deputy in sole control over the actual running of the 
Service.’® Of course, the prospect of leaving this 
influential new medium in the hands of so few would 
presumably jeopardise the BBC's well-cultivated image as an 
objective, democratic body in the service of the British 
people. The function of the BBC at the outset of war would 
nominally be as an extension of Government (particularly Mol) 
policy. However, traditional freedom from Government 
interference with content would eventually make the BBC as 
independent and powerful a force in propaganda as it had been 
in "education, information, and entertainment" up to 1939.
When war was declared, the vast majority of the public
in Scotland and elsewhere probably first got the news by
listening to the Prime Minister's speech, which was broadcast
across Britain on the newly synchronised transmitters. By
this time, radio licenses were held by some nine million
households throughout the United Kingdom, 783,883 of which
were in the Scottish Region.’® The BBC, having become a
major facet of the mass media in Britain, was providing a
profound direct link between the public and the Government. 
” Public Record Office, INF.1.362.
” Briggs, p . 179.
McDowell, p. 43.
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profound direct link between the public and the Government. 
To be able to hear directly from the Prime Minister as 
Britain went to war surely added much to the feeling of 
national unity and common purpose that the Government hoped 
to maintain in the face of heavy German attack.
The radio would soon be widely considered (especially at 
the Ministry of Information) to be a staple means by which to 
affect attitudes and behaviour within the British public, but 
this wide recognition was not immediate. Aside from the fact 
that Chamberlain and the Air Ministry were prepared to put a 
stop to broadcasting altogether for the duration of the war, 
the Government was also generally slow in making effective 
use of the medium. This is clearly seen when considering 
that, for the BBC as well as other agents of the wartime mass 
media (including the Ministry of Information), direct 
attempts at propaganda in the early days of war gave rise not 
to reinforced morale, but to a certain amount of public 
disdain. Due to the news blackout maintained by the 
Government Ministries, for example, the content of BBC 
broadcasts were widely considered to be dull and 
uninformative.
The apparent lack of BBC influence on the general morale 
of Britain in the early months of the war is hardly 
surprising given that its chief source for news and other 
programming was the Ministry of Information. After all, from 
the outbreak of war the only source for official news was 
material that had passed through the Mol, which at the time 
was experiencing difficulty in its broad functions and
Briggs, p.175.
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responsibilities.^’ Aside from the initial news blackout and 
poor cooperation that it was getting from other Government 
Departments in the release of news, the Ministry was 
struggling in their task to define and assess morale so that 
it may "direct popular opinion and forestall and prevent any 
sudden drop in public courage
Broadcasting, a popular new medium in the service of 
wartime Government, was naturally reflecting many of the 
shortcomings of the Ministry of Information. By the end of 
1939 , however, the BBC had taken the initiative to begin 
broadcasting programmes aimed at providing the Home Front 
populace with more riveting material than the Government had 
specifically prescribed. At a time when many cinemas were 
closed and newspapers smaller due to a paper shortage, 
features such as eyewitness accounts of battles and missions 
over Germany were a welcome break from the monotony of 
official news
In many ways the BBC was more experienced than the Mol 
in taking the pulse of public opinion. Their established 
methods of listener research, in the words of one Mol 
memorandum, made the BBC "more responsive to public 
opinion..as it tries to please its p u b l i c S t i l l ,  the 
onset of war signaled a shift in method; namely from 
entertainment of an audience to propaganda aimed at the 
general public, and in the eyes of the Ministry of 
Information, this shift gave the BBC a commitment (not unlike
see part I.
” Minstry of Information Correspondence- "Psychology in Propaganda" 
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McDowell, p. 43.
INF. 1.318
83
the Ministry itself), "..to satisfy the psychological needs 
of the people, and to canalise them in to most useful 
d i r e c t i o n s “ Apparently, the Ministry was able to
identify the general objectives of broadcasting in time of 
war; however, just as civilian morale and national unity were 
subject to a wide variety of interpretations and definitions, 
the so-called psychological needs of the British listening 
public were never interpreted or explained fully, making it a 
variable in virtually every debate over broadcasting as a 
propaganda medium while the war continued.
Ibid.
Chapter 6-
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In considering the evolution of the BBC and media policy 
in Great Britain after 193 9, it is clear that although the 
wartime Government had grasped the potential of broadcasting 
as a way of influencing and shaping public opinion, the 
specific method by which this influence could best be
utilised remained (like the issue of morale itself) loosely
defined. Perhaps partly as a result of such variable
interpretation, the ongoing debate on Government policy 
toward the wartime media was essentially guided by (and
centred on) the wider debate over the creation and 
application of Civil Defence Regulations. This legislation 
had by early 1940 completely altered the social, political, 
and economic landscape of Britain, and as such would be a 
powerful factor in the ideological sphere of broadcasting and 
its uses in wartime.
The development of the legislation that would be 
included under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 1939 
effectively began with the establishment of the first War 
Emergency Sub-Committee from the Committee of Imperial 
Defence in 1924.^ ® The primary objective of the committee 
from the outset was to draw up draft Defence Regulations 
(based on the Defence of the Realm Acts), which could be used 
to guide mobilisation and maintain the public order in the 
event of any future war.” Due to the relatively low 
expectation of a major war recurring, however, the committee 
met infrequently through the 192Os.
By the mid-1930s, the Committee had produced a report
Neil Stammers, civil Liberties in Britain During the Second World War, 
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By the mid-1930s, the Committee had produced a report 
that discussed the nature that such legislation might take in 
the event of another war, although most of their 
recommendations were essentially modifications of the Defence 
of the Realm Acts, Even at this stage the measures were 
decidedly drastic, providing for the detention without trial 
of citizens, as well as search of premises and seizure of 
private property.” The Regulations would undergo more 
revision at the Committee stage as time went on, but due to 
the likely reaction of the British public to a set of laws 
that would effectively suspend rights throughout the country, 
it was decided that they should not be enacted during 
peacetime. Once they were completely drawn up, the 
regulations would be enacted after war had broken out, since 
a clear national emergency would be necessary in order to 
justify the transfer of such broad powers to the Government.
On the other hand, this policy would effectively prevent 
a thorough discussion of Defence Regulations in the Commons 
until after the outbreak of war. The concept of bringing 
such legislation to bear on the British public without a 
legitimate Commons vote could have a disastrous effect on 
public opinion, as well as a hesitation in the numerous 
practical challenges faced with imminent war. Since morale 
was becoming a more prominent issue to the leadership of 
Great Britain by the late 1930s, a public revolt in reaction 
to what amounted to the complete removal of democratic 
freedoms was not beyond the realm of political imagination, 
and as a result it was decided to put the legislation to a 
Commons vote before the emergency had actually occurred. On
Stammers. p .9.
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Commons vote before the emergency had actually occurred. On
25 August, 1939, the enabling clause of the Regulations was
read in the Commons :
His Majesty may by Order in Council make such 
regulations as appear to him necessary...for 
securing public safety. Defence of the Realm, 
maintenance of public order, and efficient 
prosecution of any war.
-(Emergency Powers Defence Act, 1939, quoted in 
Stammers, p.14),
If there was going to be an initial outcry in the Commons as
many lawmakers expected, it certainly would not be over the
perceived necessity of such broad wartime powers; the Bill
was passed into law in under four hours.®®
The relatively easy ratification of the Emergency Powers
(Defence) Act is testimony to the fact that by August of
1939, there was little significant doubt that total war was
imminent, and that in order to be able to fight such a war
(and win), more Government control was necessary over the
economy and society of Great Britain. The Act, being one
that gave the Government almost total control over all
perceived factors in a British war effort, naturally
addressed the wartime use of the mass media at an early
stage, both as a form of mere persuasion and as agitative
propaganda. The linchpin section of the regulations that
could be brought to bear directly on the mass media was
Regulation 39B, which made it an offence to
—endeavour to influence, orally or otherwise, 
public opinion in a manner likely to be prejudicial 
to the defence of the realm.®’
This broad clause in the Regulations could make it very easy
Ibid, p.11. 
Stammers, p . 14
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This broad clause in the Regulations could make it very easy 
to censor or suppress any form of communication, written or 
spoken, but Section 1 of the Regulation went on to give the 
Secretary of State full power to censor any publication that 
"might" be a threat to the British war effort.
The mainstream perception of the Defence Regulations 
seems to have been of the necessary sacrifice of democracy in 
order that democracy could be preserved. Although the 
regulations as a whole were passed in the Commons with very 
little if any vocal opposition, there was, however, an 
immediate effort on the part of many MPs to ratify several 
aspects of them as soon as they had been passed, mostly in 
response to the injustices that would occur if such power was 
abused. Regulation 3 9B came under fire as early as October 
193 9, when MP Dingle Foot moved to have the entire Act 
annulled on the basis that it had no foundation in precedent, 
and on its contribution to "Nazi tendencies at home".®® After 
the motion was delivered, the discussion immediately centred 
on Regulation 39B, which was referred to as "one of the most 
menacing of the regulations", since its broad terminology 
essentially allowed the Government to suppress any individual 
(or statement) perceived as aimed to "influence public 
opinion".®®
Clearly, Defence Regulations brought some criticism from 
within the Commons from the earliest days of their 
ratification, and it came primarily due to the lack of 
explicit limits to the new powers that were being imparted to 
the Ministers of the Government, According to the new law.
House of Commons Debates (Hansard), fifth series. Vol.352, col.1929. 
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the Ministers of the Government. According to the new law, 
and as Dingle Foot and others pointed out, necessary and even 
healthy criticism of the Government or the administration of 
the war could be suppressed under Regulation 3 9B, along with 
any that directly fostered defeat and/or paranoia. Secretary 
of State John Anderson, while urging that they would be 
applied with the utmost restraint, reminded the House that 
"it is because the efficient prosecution of the war is in 
fact a necessary condition of freedom that these regulations 
are required", In spite of criticism over the proper
application of the Regulations, it was generally accepted 
that a national crisis of such magnitude called for drastic 
governmental measures.
Once in effect. Defence Regulations became a valuable 
tool of wartime policy at home, giving the Cabinet and 
Government Ministries full power over British society and its 
institutions to guide (and enforce) the nation's survival in 
the crucible of total war. However, having come at a time 
when issues like maintenance of civilian morale and effective 
use of broadcasting were still largely at an undefined stage, 
the censorship guidelines presented in Regulation 39B and 
others became the only concrete Government policy on such 
matters by 1939. As time went on and fears of a "knock-out 
blow" abated. Defence Regulations began to appear to many in 
the Commons and elsewhere as serving to oversimplify or even 
ignore many essential issues of British daily life during 
wartime. Most of these domestic issues would in turn become 
"morale" issues, and radio programming in Scotland would be a 
central focus of such criticisms.
Commons Debates, vol.35 2, col.1876
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central focus of such criticisms.
After the British declaration of war in 1939, Defence 
Regulations heralded more direct Government control over 
broadcasting throughout the country; however for the BBC, 
this was essentially nothing new. The 1926 Charter that had 
granted the BBC its authority to operate had forbade the 
discussion of 'controversial matters' on the wireless.®® In 
spite of such guidelines, Reith had won for the BBC a large 
degree of independence from Whitehall in the more creative 
and cultural aspects of broadcasting, but the traditional 
principles of the BBC (to educate, inform, and entertain) had 
by the late 30s taken on much stronger social and political 
ramifications. This was felt almost immediately when the 
censorship policy of Defence Regulations began to take shape.
In the mid-30s, as the Government began to make 
administrative preparations for the possibility of war by 
drawing up the Regulations, an attempt to gain additional 
control over the BBC in wartime was also planned. Should 
there be an outbreak of war, the entire BBC Board of 
Governors, who ordinarily made all of the creative and 
administrative decisions related to programming, would be 
taken "out of commission", and the Corporation placed under 
the direct control of the newly formed Ministry of 
Information.®® Although the Director-General and his deputy 
would be left as Governors, the Mol would prescribe 
broadcasting content and retain full veto power over 
programmes.
This complete takeover by the Government of the medium
Scannell, p.23. 
Briggs, p.179.
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This complete takeover by the Government of the medium 
of broadcasting was, like the Regulations that enabled it, 
seen by the Government as a necessary recourse in the event 
of total war. Of course, the development of censorship 
legislation was made without a working definition of what was 
required to positively reinforce public opinion in wartime. 
This was even more so with the BBC, which was originally 
going to be taken off the air completely. As a result, 
rather than positively direct the BBC, the Government in 193 9 
could only instruct the BBC as to what it could not 
broadcast, and criticisms arose almost immediately. In July 
of 1939, this was already a central focus of the BBC Board's 
argument for creative distance from Whitehall, and a formal 
complaint was submitted to Chamberlain's advisor (Horace 
Wilson) warning of the serious "blow to liberty" entailed in 
such a takeover. The complaint made sure to mention the 
difficulties that would be created for the Government "before 
the public opinion of the country", were it ever to come into 
effect,
...The only counter to the enemy's propaganda 
offensive is confidence on the Home Front in our 
ability to win the war, and positive evidence to 
show that victory is worth fighting and suffering 
for, whatever the strain on our own people...®®
-Excerpt from Ministry of Information memorandum on 
propaganda policy and issue of news, 1940 (Public 
Record Office, INF.1.851).
As discussed earlier, the fundamental goal of the 
wartime Government in the arena of "morale maintenance" was 
to endeavour to reinforce directly the general support for
Briggs, p. 179 .
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to endeavour to reinforce directly the general support for 
the war that existed throughout the country, or as official 
historian Terence O'Brien observed, to centre on the 
"maintenance of readiness versus the avoidance of panic".®® 
This was indirectly accomplished with Defence Regulations, in 
so far as they lent Whitehall the broad power that was 
necessary to direct the nation toward this goal. As time 
went on, however, the Regulations (particularly 3 9B and 
related clauses) became the sounding board for criticisms 
leveled at wartime policy, and as such represent a means by 
which to gain insight into the various stages of the Home 
Front War and its relationship with the development of 
propaganda policy in practice.
The potential of Defence Regulations as a tool for 
political repression of the media throughout Britain wrought 
criticism from even the earliest stages of their development. 
Yet, their necessity was not widely debated when war was 
declared and the country was bracing itself for a devastating 
blow from the German Luftwaffe. However, as the first few 
months of war proved to be relatively uneventful for the 
majority of civilians on the Home Front, such criticisms of 
unnecessarily broad powers gained a marked degree of 
credibility in Whitehall. The Regulations, once they had 
been put into practice, sparked protest not only from 
opposition groups such as the National Council for Civil 
Liberties, but also by the agents of the media, who in the 
wake of a zealous application of the new censorship policy 
were left with very little material with which to inform, let 
alone educate or entertain.
Terence O'Brien, Civil Defence, HMSG (London) 1955, p.298.
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alone educate or entertain.
Although the Ministry of Information, as objective 
regulator, relied largely upon the other Government 
Ministries for its own supply of news, blame for the effects 
of the "news blackout" in the first weeks of war fell 
entirely on the Mol. This lack of news was not experienced 
merely in Scotland and the other provincial areas. At a 
Cabinet meeting in September of 1939, the London press was 
reported to be "in a state of revolt" over this lack of news, 
as well as the application of the censorship policy, which 
was felt to be "depending on the whim of individual 
officials".^’ The Cabinet agreed that a certain amount of 
leniency was advisable, and that the Ministers themselves 
could alleviate the lack of news by giving broadcasts "at 
regular intervals", though the actual content or even 
frequency of such broadcasts was never specified.
While the nominal arbiters of the Defence Regulations 
were preparing to act as direct agents of broadcasting, this 
pragmatic policy of leniency was also applied directly to the 
Regulations, including those governing the Press. In October 
of 1939, a Committee met to consider amendments to 
Regulations which were creating criticisms in Parliament, 
including 39B, the clause which most directly controlled the 
content of the wartime media. By 2 3 November, its 
recommendations were enacted, and 39B was altered; though it 
remained an offense to influence public opinion negatively, 
it could only be brought to bear on those who did so by means
Ian McClaine, Ministry of Morale, Allen and Unwin (London) 1979, p37. 
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of "any false statement, document, or report"
By comparison, in the spring of the following year, when 
Britain was under threat of direct invasion by the Germans, 
the Home Secretary (Sir John Anderson) asked the Cabinet for 
more power to suppress the media. This was sparked in large 
part by the critical view of the war which was being taken by 
the Communists' Daily Worker and Action newspapers. By May 
of 1940, Regulation 2D was added, which gave the Secretary of 
State the power to suppress any newspaper in the United 
Kingdom. By this time, with the crisis government of the 
Coalition in effect, the Regulation was passed by the Cabinet 
the following day, without consulting the House of Commons ." 
Presumably, this regulation was one which needed to be 
enacted as soon as possible.'’®
The passing of such potentially strong measures of 
control over the British press after almost a year of 
"leniency" was, presumably, another facet of the Government's 
commitment to maintain the morale of the British public, 
whose ideological unity was founded upon the struggle for 
liberty against the tyranny of Nazi Germany. Thus, the 
potential for a public outcry (or even an uprising) over 
active repression of the traditional opposition press was 
also a legitimate concern to the country's leadership, both 
in and out of the Cabinet. A month after Regulation 2D was 
enacted, the Daily Worker was issued with a warning, and 
though the Home Secretary wanted to suppress the paper
Stcunmers , p. 20 .
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altogether, it was acknowledged by the Cabinet that "there 
were a number of other newspapers which were as worthy of 
drastic action as the Daily Worker"/® Eventually a full 
ban of the Worker was carried out in January of 1941, along 
with an official warning to the Daily Mirror, and for the 
remainder of the war would be the only prosecution made under 
Regulation 2D.
Apparently the wartime Government, after giving itself
complete control over the medium of the press, opted rather
to oversee that which had already been communicated by it.
The fact that the Daily Worker was the only publication to be
suppressed under Regulation 2D, however, lends considerable
validity to accusations that the Coalition government was
using the crisis of war (and Defence Regulations) not only as
a means by which to revoke civil liberties unnecessarily, but
also as a weapon against traditional political opposition.
This point was perhaps most fervently raised in the summer of
1940 by MP Willie Gallacher, himself a Communist for West
Fife, one of the districts in Scotland that had been
earmarked by Whitehall as an "area of disaffection":
The Daily Worker is in danger, not because of the 
systematic publication of material that affects the 
successful prosecution of the war, but because 
of..publication of political opinions that are not 
acceptable to the Executive in this country."
Clearly, in spite of the relative freedom that had been given 
to the British press in the wake of the "news blackout" of
1939, the Coalition Government in the invasion crisis of 1940 
was prepared to use coercion against those who did not serve
War Cabinet Minutes (Public Record Office), CAB 193(40)2, 4 July,
1940,
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was prepared to use coercion against those who did not serve 
to reinforce public support of the war effort.
Likewise, the initial question of whether or not the 
Government would use Defence Regulations to retain creative 
control over the BBC for the duration of the war was one that 
occupied members of Parliament as well as those on the 
Corporation's Board, albeit without the immediate political 
implications that arose over press censorship. This was 
largely due to the fact that, as previously mentioned, the 
BBC's tradition of independence from Whitehall carried into 
wartime practice by virtue of its overall compatibility with 
Government policy.^® Reith as Director-General had fought to 
bring political discussion to the wireless, but such 
discussion had always been within the scope of what the 
Government could (or would) allow the British public to be 
exposed to.'*® As a result of this traditional attitude of 
independence, a policy of government-supported self­
censorship existed within the BBC, to the degree that when 
the Under-Secretary of Mol asserted in the Commons in 1941 
that "the BBC accepts the direction of the Mol in all matters 
affecting the National effort", he drew protest from the 
Corporation for having made such a presumption.
This overall cooperation of the BBC with the censorship
policy of Whitehall from the outset of war was immediately
perceived by many to be a compromise of the very qualities
which could have empowered wartime broadcasting as a medium
of support for the national wartime ideology of democracy
against tyranny. One such insight came from Peter Eckersley, 
" Stammers, 154.
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against tyranny. One such insight came from Peter Eckersley, 
whose experience from within the Corporation led him to 
assert that
..there can be no bias in a policy which allows 
free expression of controversial opinions... The 
degree of censorship must depend on the 
directorate's interpretation of its duties. What is 
wanted is a wise and witty directorate having the 
courage of its intellect rather than its 
convictions. . .
Moreover, the BBC, by virtue of its compatibility with the 
fundamental aims of the wartime Government, was able to 
maintain this independence of operations for the duration of 
the war. It was through this creative independence that 
Reith was able to make the BBC a primary link between the 
wartime British Government and civilians on the Home Front.
At the height of the 'news blackout' at the end of 1939, 
when Reith began to take matters into his own hands and 
broadcast material that would help bring the war directly 
into civilian homes, it had become clear that the wireless 
was going to prove a valuable tool for influencing public 
opinion on the Home Front. The Ministry of Information, 
however, did not use the power imparted by Defence 
Regulations to dominate the operation of the medium with 
specific restrictions. Rather, as the BBC continued to play 
its wartime role as ideological link between government and 
the British people, it became clear that its traditional 
directive, like its new administration, ran parallel to the 
nature of morale maintenance that the Government had strived 
to define. Like the Ministry of Information, however, its 
active role would make it the target of criticism both from
Eckersley, p . 156.
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active role would make it the target of criticism both from 
the British Government and the British people, including 
those whose perceived needs were not being met by the wartime 
Service.
Once the Government had established a wartime monopoly 
over use of the mass media throughout the United Kingdom, it 
was taking on responsibility toward its audience that 
ordinarily would fall on the individual agents of the media 
themselves. Thus, the question of whether the Government in 
its censorship policy adequately served, or even 
acknowledged, the kinds of specialised ideological needs 
borne out in morale reports from Glasgow can be addressed in 
part by considering how it asserted itself as a trusted 
information source for the Scottish people. After all, if the 
desired action and inaction of the Scots within a national 
war effort could be affected by London-based propaganda, it 
would be through acceptance of Whitehall's interpretations of 
Scotland's needs.
As with other forms of administrative decentralisation 
that occurred in Scotland at the outbreak of war, the 
establishment of a Regionally-based censorship office in 
Edinburgh came more as an indirect result of practical 
necessity than in reaction to so-called specialised needs. 
The Ministry of Information's offices were dispersed 
throughout the United Kingdom to maintain the ever-evolving 
centralised Government policy at local and regional levels, 
as well as to provide for fast coordination of local efforts 
in the event of attack or invasion. According to one 
Ministry memorandum, the Regional Information Officers were 
expected to act as representatives of the Ministry in their
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Ministry memorandum, the Regional Information Officers were 
expected to act as representatives of the Ministry in their 
areas, to ensure adequate dispersal of the Ministry's 
circulars and other material to the target populations, and 
to act as advisors on the Government censorship policy when 
needed.“ The Regional Officers initially had no authority to 
censor the media in their areas without permission from 
London, and all decisions regarding censorship issues had to 
be made centrally before a Regional Officer could act.“
Of course, in wartime it was also necessary for 
information to reach its intended audience quickly, and it 
did not take long for practical problems of centralised 
decision-making for the provinces to make themselves 
apparent. The first Civil Defence Region to suggest a de­
centralised censorship office for this reason was that of 
Northern Ireland, where from the outbreak of hostilities in 
1939 it was noted that "censorship undermines competition 
with [the press of] Eire, who don't censor".®^ After a visit 
to Northern Ireland, the Ministry of Information agreed to 
set up a regional organisation to relay news "from authentic 
sources", and it was acknowledged that such a scheme would 
effectively be "censorship in all but name".“
As soon as the plan for partial decentralisation of 
censorship in Northern Ireland was launched, the precedent 
was soon used to argue for more Regional independence in 
other areas, including Scotland and Wales. The issue of
Ministry of Information Correspondence, "Regional Censorship" (Public 
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specialised ideological needs was utilised immediately by the 
Regional Officer in Wales, who asserted that it would serve 
to "convince Wales that her vital interests are not being 
overlooked by the Government in London"/® When regionally- 
based censorship began in April of 1940, sheer distance from 
London made it advisable in Edinburgh. In spite of the 
argument made by the Officer in Wales, as well as the 
difficulties presented by popular use of the Welsh language, 
the only other area to be given this relative autonomy was 
Birmingham, England. At least in the case of Government 
censorship, decentralization in provincial areas does not 
seem to have been motivated directly by the issue of 
questionable morale.
As a result of the regional basis to the Government's 
censorship policy as it existed in Scotland, Information 
Officers in the region were capable of acting to a certain 
degree without direct guidance from London. Although the 
censorship policy, being based "upon strategic necessity', 
was generally uniform throughout the United Kingdom, the 
regional basis provided the Scottish press with the 
convenience of a fast, localised authority from which 
decisions on content could be made. Perhaps more 
importantly, however, as the Regional Office performed its 
duty to represent the Ministry of Information to the Scottish 
people, inevitably it would have to react on behalf of the 
Scottish people as a nation when relating to the general 
policies of the central office in London, and in that 
capacity would come to support the interests that were 
perceived as vital to the maintenance of Scottish morale.
Ibid.
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perceived as vital to the maintenance of Scottish morale. 
Soon, the Ministry's Scottish office would be playing a key 
role in the debate over Scottish needs in broadcasting.
In looking at the propaganda aimed at the British 
populace by the Ministry of Information and the wartime BBC, 
it is clear that the emphasis that the war placed on national 
unity was one that had to be reinforced by appealing to the 
varied communities within the country on a common nationalist 
level. As previously mentioned, the new medium of 
broadcasting gave propaganda an unprecedented ability to draw 
the nation together as individuals toward the common cause 
presented by total war, which at the outset was one of mere 
survival. Chamberlain's ability to speak directly to the 
people of Britain in their own living rooms when war broke 
out in 1939 certainly lent credibility to the assumption that 
the war on the Home Front was going to be a common experience 
that would unify the country like never before. However, the 
cross-cultural nature of the mass media (especially in 
wartime) could often run counter to the forms of nationalist 
feeling at regional levels that would need to be maintained 
if civilian morale was to be strengthened. In the case of 
Scotland, alienation stemming from an Anglo-centric view of 
the Home Front war by both the Mol and the BBC would soon 
develop into a problem which, many would argue, could only be 
rectified through independent broadcasting.
During the inter-war years of radio's development from 
enthusiasts' hobby to major facet of the British mass-media, 
the National Service by definition did not cater to the 
specialised tastes of Scottish (or any other) regional 
audiences. Rather, it served as a means by which to provide
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specialised tastes of Scottish (or any other) regional
audiences. Rather, it served as a means by which to provide
the average (that is to say, English) listener with the
highest quality of service. Regional interests before 1939
were adequately addressed by the regionally-based stations,
which specialised in providing audiences with a more
localised form of information, education, and entertainment.
It was through this choice of programming that the BBC Board
could prescribe alternatives to suit these specialised needs,
which co-existed with those that the Scottish region had in
common with the rest of Great Britain.
In 1939, however, the military- necessity of
synchronisation brought an end to Regional programming, and
the only way for broadcasting of any kind to exist was
through an exclusively National service on the Home Front.
The BBC, after bringing political discussion and other items
of interest to the wireless following the 'news blackout' in
the first months of the war, was successful in maintaining
basic cross-cultural national unity by identifying a wide
range of shared interests of the country as a whole.®’ It was
acknowledged fairly early by the Ministry of Information in
the Scottish region however, that Scotland would require
special attention:
..The task in Scotland, therefore, is one of 
providing programmes for l i s t e n e r s a n d  of
breaking down the national reserve which exists in 
many country districts. What is required,
therefore, is a campaign of intensive 
propaganda. . .
Evidently, the appeal of the BBC's national service to 
Scannell, pl3.
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Evidently, the appeal of the BBC’s national service to 
Scottish people was one that ideally would need to be 
supplemented.
After practical necessity had made the BBC an 
exclusively national broadcaster, there was a strong 
possibility of criticism relating to a certain lack of 
attention paid to provincial interests. Of course, 
complaints in reference to the London-centric slant of the 
national programme were certainly not without precedent in 
1939. This perceived one-sidedness was exacerbated by the 
subservience of individual presenters to the Corporate image 
of the BBC, whose opinions and individual cultural biases 
inadvertently brought direct responsibility upon the BBC 
itself. During the BBC's rise in the 1920s, when London- 
based control increased, Regional Directors who voiced this 
concern were instructed by Reith.to accept such bias as a 
"cultural loss" that was compensated by the superior quality 
of the London broadcast. This was partially rectified by 
the advent of Regional broadcasting, but as one Home Office 
memorandum warned, "those who have not been much in the 
provinces cannot assess the extraordinary value placed upon 
the local station by provincial listeners".®® By 1939, with 
programme options eliminated, these problems, though ongoing 
throughout the Corporation's development, would be elevated 
to the level of morale issues when they began to resurface 
more vocally than ever.
After war broke out, the supposed cross-cultural
approach of the BBC in its broadcasting was soon perceived as
Scannell, p. 323.
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approach of the BBC in its broadcasting was soon perceived as
being culturally biased, and this was seen not only on the
basis of content but in reference to the presentation of the
medium itself. The standard accent of the BBC presenters,
for example, being invariably that of Home-Counties English,
was considered by many Scottish listeners to be a 'deliberate
class barrier',®^ By June of 1940, this was reported by the
Home Morale Emergency Committee to be an ongoing problem:
...After referring to an increase in class 
resentment in the country..it is suggested that 
something might be done to diminish the present 
predominance of the cultured voice upon the 
wireless. Every effort should be made to bring 
working-class people to the microphone...®^
Apparently, with the importance that the Home Front war
brought to unity and loyalty of the lower classes for the war
effort, this resentment was one of concern for the wartime
Government. This cultural barrier, be it real or imagined,
would serve to fuel the assertion by Scottish leaders that
the needs of Scots were not being sufficiently addressed by
the wartime media.
The standardised Home-Counties accent of BBC presenters
was a potential liability if the BBC was to render its entire
audience more receptive to its programming. However, from
Scotland came great concern over the programmes themselves,
which were seen as lacking recognition of the Scots as a
nation within Britain, possessing profound cultural
differences that would have to be served if Scottish morale
was to be nurtured. In July of 1940 , the Ministry of
Information Committee on Broadcasting reported "anti-English 
“ McDowell, p.31.
Ministry of Information- Home Morale Emergency Committee (Public 
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Information Committee on Broadcasting reported "anti-English 
feeling" resulting from the fact that "nothing has been done 
so far to appeal to Scottish, as opposed to English, 
traditions".®^ This anti-English feeling, according to the 
conclusions of the Committee, could only be remedied by 
"putting on programmes specifically designed to appeal to the 
patriotism of Scotland". ®^ Apparently, the propaganda of the 
BBC's national broadcasts, by not acknowledging these 
cultural differences, was in danger of sacrificing its 
credibility toward Scottish listeners. In wartime, this 
could not be considered an acceptable "cultural loss".
Where the lack of homage paid to Scottish national 
culture was considered alienating, there was also 
broadcasting content that the Scots found insulting. In 
addition to the potential public dismay caused in Scotland by 
the lack of Scottish issues on the national programme, the 
Committee on Broadcasting was also quick to warn of the 
dangers caused by the BBC’s "active slighting of Scottish 
susceptibilities", such as the use by presenters of the word 
"English" where "British" was intended,®® Such errors of 
reference, according to the Committee, were enough to put the 
average Scottish listener in "an antagonistic, unreceptive 
mood".®® At a time when both the MOI and the BBC were 
actively striving to reinforce British national unity and 
neutralise perceived threats to the war effort on the Home 
Front, constant reference to the Scottish nation as merely a
Ministry of Information- Proposed Scottish Radio Programme (Public 
Record Office, INF.1.162), 1939-41.
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part of England certainly did not help win active support of 
the BBC as a reliable representative of the Scottish public 
interest.
It is apparent that the National Service was by 
definition inadequate to the specific interests of many 
Scottish listeners. However, in considering whether the 
conclusions of the Ministry of Information Committee on 
Broadcasting were an accurate reflection of majority listener 
opinion within Scotland, it is clear that, as with Mass 
Observation's Glasgow morale report, the perceived danger of 
a complete "morale breakdown" sparked by the oversights and 
limitations of the BBC was exaggerated. After all, the 
Scottish public were just as interested in non-Scottish, 
London-based programmes, as they provided the reinforcement 
of the British nationalism that fueled the war effort." But 
as with the other issues that called attention to "Scottish 
morale" throughout the war, the basis of perceptions in fact 
did little to allay their very real consequences. This is 
seen in the Government correspondence that centred on the 
work of the BBC in the Scottish Region, where it was 
considered inevitable by Information officers that public 
opinion there would be harder to bolster. In a memorandum 
from the BBC's Director of Broadcasting Relations to the Mol 
Controller for the Scottish region in 1940, it was 
acknowledged that "it is inherent in wartime circumstances 
that instances of centralisation and..control from London 
should multiply". According to the Director, it was also 
inevitable that this would in turn spark "the growth of 
Scottish Nationalism and restiveness in the minds of more
McDowell, p.4 9
107
Scottish Nationalism and restiveness in the minds of more 
balanced and sensible people..."®® Clearly then, the 
political implications of this perceived bias from within the 
BBC could be affected directly.
Aside from potential growth of Scottish Nationalism 
resulting from neglected cultural issues, there was 
relatively strong concern over the use that could be made of 
the issue by the Communists, whose own propaganda at the time 
was thought to be aimed at instilling a Bolshevik revolution 
in Scotland. In 1940, this was stated clearly in a condensed 
report from Regional Defence Commissioners, where it was 
named as the foremost danger to morale in some areas, namely 
Scotland as well as the South of Wales. By comparison. 
Fascism and provincial Nationalist movements were not 
considered to be "immediate dangers" in any region at the 
time, though the Welsh Nationalists were said to number over 
40, 000, and "developing along Sinn Fein lines".®® Such 
reports make clear that if the specific national culture of 
Scotland was not made more prevalent on the wireless, there 
could be very real and potenially even disastrous political 
consequences for the war effort.
Perhaps the most fundamental consequence of the cultural 
neglect that was making itself apparent in the wartime 
broadcasting arena was a form of indirect, culturally-based 
censorship. By de-prioritising the kinds of programming 
policies that Dinwiddie and others were suggesting for
Ministry of Information- Memo from BBC Programmes Controller to Mol 
Director of Broadcasting Relations, 4 April, 1940 (Public Record 
Office), INF.1.162.
" Ministry of Information- "Pacifist, Communist, Fascist Propaganda 
1939-41"- Reports from Regional Commissioners (Public Record Office, 
INF.1.319), 9 March, 1940.
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policies that Dinwiddie and others were suggesting for 
strengthening the morale of the Scots, the BBC and the Mol 
were essentially overlooking many of the factors that made 
broadcasting such a potentially powerful medium of 
propaganda. The ability of broadcasting to involve the 
listener's senses and provide a vital civic and psychological 
link to the war effort was compromised by this lack of 
specialised programming. The Scottish people, being a 
culturally separate nation within Britain, were arguably in 
need of this special attention.
Even if exaggerated, the perception on the part of the 
BBC's critics of unwillingness to give more attention to 
"Scottish interests" had become an issue that could be used 
as a factor in claims of endangered Scottish morale such as 
those emanating from Clydeside. However, many of the the 
BBC ' s shortcomings in providing the kind of regional 
programming that the Scots needed were purely practical. 
Even if the BBC or Mol had decided that it was advisable to 
continue Scottish regional programming after the outbreak of 
war in 1939, for example, the strategic necessity of 
synchronisation to a single wavelength would have made it 
impossible. As mentioned earlier, due to this lack of 
alternative wavelengths, the only programme available in 1939 
was the National Service, which was broadcast daily 
throughout Britain from 7pm to midnight.’® In order to
provide the Scots with specialised programmes at the outset, 
the BBC would have had to force all of Britain to listen to 
announcements and programming which applied only to the 
Scottish Region.
McDowell, p.42
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Scottish Region.
On the other hand, however, the exclusively national 
programme caused confusion as well as alienation in the 
Scottish Region, where there was no way of knowing whether 
national announcements and bulletins actually applied to 
Scotland. If Mass Observation and others were correct in 
claiming that the Scots in the early stages of the war were 
relating to the war effort in a detached way, then such 
difficulty with the validity of public announcements would 
certainly not have helped the situation.’^ Even in 1940 , 
when an extra wavelength was added to provide for the Forces 
programme, and again in 1944 for a General Forces programme 
(allowing soldiers and civilians to listen to the same 
broadcast), the practical limitation presented by 
synchronisation would be repeatedly given throughout the war 
as the primary obstacle to specialised programming for 
Scotland.”
In November of 1939, when Scottish Regional Defence 
Commissioner Tom Johnston proposed the creation of a separate 
radio wavelength for Scotland, based on the need to 
strengthen involvement and support of the war effort. Sir 
John Anderson conveyed that "his suggestion of a separate 
programme for Scotland could not be adopted without 
modification of the present system of synchronisation" 
Although synchronisation was a legitimate rationale for the 
lack of special interest programming on the Home Front, there
McDowell, p. 46.
See part 1.
” McDowell, p. 49.
Public Record Office, INF.1.162. Memo from John Anderson to MacMillan, 
27 November, 1939.
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were those who eventually saw it as a hackneyed excuse used
by the Mol and the BBC to answer accusations of a bias
against specialised forms of wartime programming. One such
critic was Peter Eckersley, who by 1941 had stepped down as
Chief Engineer at the BBC. According to Eckersley,
synchronisation was far more of a bolster to the BBC's
cultural biases than a defensive necessity:
The BBC does not want to take on cultural 
attitudes... The very lack of wavelengths which 
brought it into being is its excuse to go on being 
careful and cautious..,’®
Obviously for Eckersley (whose expertise in the field of 
broadcasting would suggest acceptance of practical 
limitations), the lack of wavelengths that existed in wartime 
Britain was merely an excuse to strengthen the hegemony of 
its cultural biases over the British public.
Eckersley, p.22.
Chapter 7-
Government/BBC Policy and Ongoing Scottish Programming
Proposals
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The BBC's control over the broadcasting medium brought 
inevitable criticism regarding specialised programming and 
the so-called cultural needs of its listeners, as well as 
other factors that could be identified as influential on 
public morale. It is also clear that the BBC’s policy of 
self-censorship made it a more independent agent of 
propaganda on the Home Front than anything resembling the 
handservant of the Ministry of Information that Defence 
Regulations could have created. This freedom from the broad- 
reaching controls of the wartime Government certainly gave 
the Corporation independent responsibility. The proposal for 
a separate Scottish radio wavelength being made by Thomas 
Johnston, and supported by the Scottish Regional Committee on 
Broadcasting, was one that stemmed from the sort of 
criticisms that were expected toward an organisation 
dominating the medium. However, in spite of its connection 
with the larger issue of public morale in Scotland, the 
Government itself refrained from fundamental reprehensions, 
due to the fact that lack of wavelengths seemed to make it 
impossible to act on Johnston's request. Of course, this 
practical limitation was not enough to quell complaints from 
Johnston and others that the BBC, rather than reinforcing 
public support for the war, was endangering it with its 
inherent administrative and creative biases.
Considering the established importance of the BBC and 
its policies, there was little comprehensive debate in the 
Commons addressing the wartime workings of the BBC itself, 
but rather its connection with other, wider issues like 
propaganda in general. By April of 1943, MP George McGovern 
urged for more scrutiny to be placed over the BBC, asserting
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propaganda in general. By April of 1943, MP George McGovern 
urged for more scrutiny to be placed over the BBC, asserting 
that the BBC's domination of the medium evidenced a complete 
takeover of the wartime Government over the opinion of the 
public :
..[the BBC] is being directed on totalitarian lines 
and..the Government should take the necessary steps 
to secure that more opportunity should be given for 
the propagation of the different shades of 
opinion. . so that they should be used as an 
instrument of democracy instead of one for the 
creation of an authoritative regime in this 
country. . .
These remarks by McGovern actually came as a response to the 
Government’s ban of a scheduled performance of the Glasgow 
Orpheus choir, whose conductor (Sir Hugh Robertson) was known 
to express anti-war views.” The issue, however, was directly 
linked to perceived narrowness of the BBC's programming. In 
seconding Mr. McGovern's amendment, Mr. Stephen of Glasgow 
gave a plea that "this instrument should not be used as if it 
belonged to the Tory Party, but it should give the liberty to 
different shades of opinion to express themselves" 
Apparently, the political implications of the BBC's cultural 
programming biases were as inevitable as its practical 
limitations.
Some MPs, in spite of general support of the BBC's
wartime efforts, were certainly not lax in their efforts to
break the BBC's control of the broadcasting medium whenever
it seemed to pose a threat to liberty and diversity of the
country. Of course, the alternative viewpoints that MPs like
McGovern and others saw as neglected by the BBC could have 
Commons Debates, Vol.388, col.835.
Ibid, col. 848.
Ibid, col.852.
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McGovern and others saw as neglected by the BBC could have 
emanated from anywhere in Britain. However, the issue of 
priority to specific "morale needs" of Scottish civilians was 
utilised most vocally throughout the war by Thomas Johnston 
and the Scottish Regional Committee on Broadcasting, as well 
as (on occasion) from within the Ministry of Information 
itself :
I thought that the series on Freedom was stopped 
because of the examples given; three-quarters of 
them were anti-English... If I can think of any 
Scots who defended their freedom against some 
country other than England or one of our Allies I 
will let you know...”
-Excerpt from a BBC memorandum by Andrew Stewart, 
Director of Programming Relations, 1940
As is seen in the remarks made in the Commons by critics 
of the Mol and BBC, the perceived failure on the part of the 
BBC to remain a politically objective entity in its wartime 
broadcasting was an issue that continued throughout the war. 
A significant consequence of this general shortcoming was 
thought to be exacerbated in the Scottish Region by the BBC's 
failure to concede a form of programming thought to be more 
acceptable to the people in that Region, By not providing 
this specialised programming, the BBC and Ministry of 
Information were risking credibility as a reliable source of 
information in a region considered by Whitehall to be in need 
of concerted morale maintenance. According to the arguments 
of Thomas Johnston and others, this was an oversight that 
would need to be rectified if the Scots were to remain a part 
of a unified Home Front war effort, politically as well as
Ministry of Information (Public Record Office), INF.1.162 Memo from 
Andrew Stewart to Moultrie Kensall, BBC Programme Director, 3 October, 
1940.
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of a unified Home Front war effort, politically as well as 
otherwise.
In November of 1939, in the midst of wholesale criticism 
of the BBC and the Ministry of Information throughout the 
country, Thomas Johnston (then Regional Defence Commissioner 
in Scotland) had begun to enquire into the possibility of a 
separate BBC programme for Scotland. In a letter to Sir John 
Anderson relating to general morale in Scotland, Johnston 
pointed out that the BBC's programming was generally 
inadequate to Scotland, He affirmed that morale was "on the 
whole" doing well, but insisted that this was not being 
helped by the BBC’s broadcasts, which had recently omitted 
several news items of "urgent importance" to Scotland from 
their broadcast.®® According to Johnston, vain attempts to 
make the BBC fully aware of the importance of these items 
(relating to the Home food campaign) were "rather 
disheartening", and the time had come "to face up to the 
issue" of a wavelength for the purpose of broadcasting food 
bulletins and other matters relating to what he called 
"distinct Scottish affairs and interests"." In closing, 
Johnston also intimated that there was great anxiety over 
being denied better access to "our most effective channel of 
reaching the Scottish people"." Apparently, when making this 
appeal to the Secretary of Defence, the issue overlaying the 
lack of attention being paid to Scottish issues was 
principally one of morale, which would elevate its urgency.
The immediate reaction of Government and BBC officials
Ministry of Information (Public Record Office), INF.1.162- Letter from 
Thomas Johnston to John Anderson, 23 November, 1939.
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The immediate reaction of Government and BBC officials 
to Johnston's proposal was unfavorable. The synchronisation 
of transmitters was given as the main reason for the 
impossibility of a Scottish wavelength, but there was also 
some "alarm" expressed by the BBC at his suggestion, since 
"all energies must be directed towards establishing the new 
programme for the British Expeditionary Force".®® It is not 
surprising that a higher priority was given to the BEE 
programme, and Johnston would certainly agree to its 
necessity. After all, the new wavelength would include items 
of interest to Scottish troops in the field. Anderson did 
support the idea of increased air time for Scottish 
programming and announcements, "in the event that a separate 
programme is out of the question". ®^ However, neither the 
practical limitation of the lack of wavelengths available, 
nor the consolation of increased programming on the National 
Service was enough to quell the complaints that were coming 
from the Scottish Region.
Those representing Scotland's interests from within the 
Mol, nominally in a position of some control over the 
programming of the BBC, also met with little success in 
arguing the case for a separate programme throughout the war. 
One such argument was made in August of 1940 by Moultrie 
Kensall, acting Mol Programme Director for Scotland. While 
not as strong as the comments being made by some Scottish 
leaders, Kensall conceded that the Ministry Committee on 
Broadcasting took "a very low view of the work being done for
Scotland by the BBC", and that "we should be doing all in our
INF.1.162- Letter forwarded to TJ by Lord Macmillan, 21/12/39]
INF. 1.162- Letter from Sec. of Defence John Anderson to Lord 
MacMillan, 27 November, 194 0.
117
Scotland by the BBC", and that "we should be doing all in our 
power to eliminate anything that tends toward disunity". ®® 
This appeal to the need for civil and political stability 
among a Home Front population in Britain, being a fundamental 
priority for the Mol and the wartime BBC, was nevertheless 
met with a negative response.
In considering the programming that already existed for 
Scottish audiences during this time, it is clear that 
although the morale issue was probably being used 
deliberately to draw Whitehall's attention to alternative 
programming proposals, inadequate programming was not a 
figment of Thomas Johnston's imagination. According to 
Ministry of Information lists of BBC broadcasts aimed toward 
Scottish audiences in the month of August, 1940, there were a 
mere five scheduled Scottish talks, and no musical 
performances at all.®® Likewise, the scheduled programmes 
for the month of October of the same type numbered only four. 
By comparison, the Welsh Region was scheduled for nine talks 
in the Welsh language in each month, respectively.®’ A 
separate list compiled by the Mol, giving a summary of 
Scottish contributions to broadcasting (organised according 
to programme type), also revealed a very sparse selection of 
Scottish programmes. Scottish postscripts in the news, for 
example, which had been the focus of many original complaints 
to the BBC, numbered only two or three per month.®® If the
Ministry of Information, "Mol Proposed Scottish Program; Letter to A 
Stewart from Moultrie Kensall, Programme Director 15/8/40" (Public 
Kembrd.Office, INF.1.162) .
Ministry of Information Correspondence, "Lists of Mol Radio 
Broadcasts", 1940 (Public Record office, INF.1.172).
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to the BBC, numbered only two or three per month.®® If the 
Scottish public was in any way predisposed to radio 
programming that pertained directly to them as a nation, 
their needs were certainly not being met in 1940.
By January of 1941, after additional wavelengths had 
been added to the BBC Home Service, the argument for a 
separate broadcast was restated to Whitehall, this time by 
McNicoll, the Scottish Regional Officer of the Ministry of 
Information. At this point, the same sort of morale argument 
made by Johnston in 1939 was put more strongly. In addition 
to the difficulties created by announcements not pertaining 
to Scotland (or its separate civil government offices), the 
morale issue was specifically mentioned in regard to the 
threat of "communist influence in the industrial areas" of 
the country.®® Stewart also made sure to point out that the 
ongoing problem of Communist influence could only be 
alleviated through "a technique based on Scottish conditions 
and the Scottish idiom".®® This proposal, like that of 
Johnston, was not met with a positive response from the BBC 
or Whitehall.
The claims of potential danger to morale by Johnston and 
others, though perhaps exaggerated, were certainly addressing 
a perceived need among the civilian populace in that region. 
The drive for increased Scottish programming took on 
political overtones as soon as it began, an inevitable result 
of its connection with the wartime Government's active 
attempts to maintain civilian morale. Perhaps more decisive.
Ibid.
" Ministry of Information- Memorandum of Andrew Stewart RIO to Reg. 
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attempts to maintain civilian morale. Perhaps more decisive, 
however, was the presumption in Whitehall that Scottish unity 
toward the war effort was in many ways more delicate than 
elsewhere. These factors made the morale issue an obvious 
vehicle for those who were trying to give such programming a 
sense of urgency in Whitehall. Likewise, the BBC had direct 
involvement in this sociopolitical issue as a popular and 
powerful independent force in the wartime mass media.
The political nature of the creative decisions being 
made in broadcasting during wartime was certainly an 
inevitable by-product of its pervasiveness as a propaganda 
medium. As such, the question of whether the Scottish Region 
could (or should) have a separate programme was one that 
immediately became a part of the wider issue of whether or 
not the centralised wartime Government could adequately serve 
the general needs of provincial interests. In 1940-41, when 
the case for increased (or separate) Scottish programming was 
being made most strongly toward the Mol, the practical 
limitations inherent in the wartime service took a backseat 
to the stated need for so-called political justification. 
Moreover, the idea of decentralization of programming was 
never given serious consideration by the Cabinet, where it 
was thought to be creating a dangerous precedent for the 
needs of the British populace as a unified whole. Hugh 
Dowden, for example, commented that "Wales will scream loud 
and hard if a separate Scottish programme should ever 
materialise".
Likewise, when Scottish programmes on the National 
Service were taken off rather than added to the monthly
Ministry of Information 7/2/41(Public Record Office INF.1.162).
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Service were taken off rather than added to the monthly 
schedule of the BBC, it was often for unspecified "political" 
reasons. When these omissions could possibly be seen as an 
unjustified bias on the part of Whitehall and the BBC (as 
with the ban on the Glasgow Orpheus Choir), the issue would 
inescapably lead to the effect that might be wrought upon 
Scottish morale. This was also apparent after the 
discontinuation of a programme entitled "The Week in 
Scotland", which was aimed at providing the kind of 
specialised programming that John Anderson. thought would 
allay the need for a separate wavelength. In one memorandum 
from the Mol to the Director of Broadcasting Relations for 
the BBC, it was conveyed that the programme "was only to be 
accepted on substantial political justification".®^ If the 
stated purpose of the "Week in Scotland" and related 
programmes was to act as a means for Scottish morale 
maintenance, the implication seemed to be that "political 
justification" for such a programme would have to include an 
apparent collapse of Scottish morale. This was acknowledged 
in a response to Wellington's memorandum, which urged the BBC 
to begin the programme "before it is strictly necessary", 
lest it be taken as a deliberate political move. 
Apparently, the BBC and Ministers of the Coalition 
government, though seeking political justification for 
specialised Scottish programming, did not want their 
decisions to appear as being politically motivated.
Clearly, the danger posed to civilian morale in the
Scottish Region by the lack of variety or specialised
Ministry of Information letter to REL Wellington, 10/2/40 (Public 
Record Office, INF.1.162).
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Scottish Region by the lack of variety or specialised 
programming was not considered a case for concerted effort on 
the part of the Ministry of Information or the BBC. The 
practical limitations of the service, together with higher 
priorities for additional wavelengths, gave the case for a 
separate Scottish wavelength a low priority. Beyond that, 
for the BBC to implement a separate wavelength acknowledging 
Scotland as a culturally unique nation within Britain would 
run against their fundamental mission as propagandists. 
After all, to allow an entirely separate service for the 
Scottish people would reinforce not only their uniqueness and 
inherent culture, but also nationalism in general, and 
therefore would legitimise the perceived tendency of the 
Scots to feel removed from the war effort and from Britain as 
a nation. As to the question of whether the London-centric 
National Service alienated more Scottish listeners than it 
co-opted, there is little evidence showing that the lack of a 
Scottish wavelength itself created wholesale discontent 
across the country, and thus the drastic measure of creating 
a separate wavelength was never given serious consideration. 
The potential threat to London-based propaganda that was 
taken very seriously, however, was the alternative listening 
provided to Scotland by the Germans.
Considering the repeated proposals of Johnston and 
others, it is clear that the Scottish Region was one whose 
civilian population could have benefited greatly from an 
alternative, more specialised wireless service, and in 
wartime this issue was one that bore directly on the belief 
that Scottish morale was in need of special attention. The 
London-based National Programme, though largely fulfilling
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that Scottish morale was in need of special attention. The 
London-based National Programme, though largely fulfilling 
its Reithian mission to educate, inform, and entertain, 
nevertheless lacked the ability to serve many of the distinct 
predispositions of the Scots, whose unique condition of being 
a separate country within Britain made the London-based 
service inadequate. The negative effects of this inadequacy 
on public opinion in Scotland could easily be justified by 
asserting that the lack of variety was a necessary sacrifice 
to be made on behalf of the war effort. As such, the kind of 
alienation and unreceptiveness that was created among Scots 
by the London-centric broadcast was seen by many in the BBC 
and Mol as an inert issue, as long as Scots continued to 
listen to the National Service in spite of its shortcomings. 
One trend on the British Home Front that kept the issue of 
Scottish needs alive from a propaganda perspective, however, 
was its relation to the trend among civilians throughout 
Britain of listening to other programme services aimed at 
Britain by the enemy rather than live with the BBC's lack of 
variety as a wartime sacrifice. As previously discussed, 
this tendency became an issue of grave importance to the 
Government, as it was considered to be indicative of a major 
failure of morale and of Home Front propaganda generally. 
In Scotland, where morale was perceived as precarious, 
increased listening of such broadcasts was considered a 
particularly alarming trend.
As discussed earlier, the definition and criteria for 
sound Home Front morale could vary wildly, depending on the 
Government Department attempting to assess it and the 
prevailing conditions on the Home Front at the time of
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Government Department attempting to assess it and the 
prevailing conditions on the Home Front at the time of 
assessment. In the realm of the wartime mass media, one 
trend that was considered to be a glaring sign of precarious 
morale by virtually all concerned was the tendency of British 
civilians to listen to the programmes of "Lord Haw-Haw" and 
other German broadcasts.®* The popularity of programmes 
designed specifically to crush the unity and resolve of the 
British Home Front naturally meant trouble for the BBC as 
well as the Mol. It evidenced an obvious shortcoming in the 
ability of the Home Service to meet its most fundamental 
wartime objective of conveying the British Home-Front 
ideology.
This was certainly not a problem that affected the 
Scottish Region exclusively, however. With 33% of civilians 
throughout Britain listening to the German broadcasts by 
early 1940, the occurrence of so-called "Haw-Haw listening" 
was fairly widespread.®® As with any other use of the media 
that supposedly represented a threat to Home-Front solidarity 
and/or morale, however, there was immediately an added 
dimension to the danger in regard to the Scottish Region. 
Due to the perceived danger of latent Scottish nationalism 
and other supposed symptoms of weak or questionable morale, 
groups like the Mass Observation Unit and the Mol considered 
the Scots to be more susceptible to such broadcasts, their 
loyalty to British unity traditionally less solidified.®®
Such avid listening of German broadcasts in the Scottish
Angus Calder, The People's War, Cape (London) 1971, p.135.
Balfour, p. 139.
Mass Observation, "Preliminary Report on Morale in Glasgow" 
(Strathclyde Regional Archives, AGN.2252).
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Such avid listening of German broadcasts in the Scottish 
Region was observed by Information officers who had been 
reporting periodically to Home Intelligence as to the general 
condition of morale in industrial areas. According to one 
memorandum inspired by informal discussions with Clyde 
workers, for example, it was noted that several talks had 
centred on the subject of Lord Haw-Haw broadcasts, and that 
many workers "believed a good deal of what the Germans said 
on the radio".®’ Comments by some of the workers that were 
directly quoted in the report included those expressing 
general praise for the quality of the German broadcasts, as 
well as praise of Hitler himself, whose definition of British 
capitalism was said to be "first class".®® The mere fact that 
British civilians were regularly tuning in to such broadcasts 
was a matter for concern in Whitehall, being as it was in 
direct violation of Defence Regulations. In addition to 
praise of the German broadcasts, however, the Clyde workers 
interviewed also expressed scorn and general scepticism of 
the work of the BBC.®® In light of existing claims regarding 
the BBC's neglect of Scottish needs, this increased listening 
of German broadcasts was immediately seen as a direct result 
of failure on the part of the BBC to fully co-opt the Scots 
as an audience.
By comparison, however, similar reports generated from 
English Defence Regions were very expressive of these same 
views, and in some cases were in decidedly stronger terms. 
One letter received by the Ministry of Information from an
Ministry of Information Correspondence- Haw-Haw Broadcasts 1940-44 
(Public Record Office, INF.1.265).
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One letter received by the Ministry of Information from an 
English munitions worker complained that her co-workers 
called her "alsorts of fools" for believing the BBC 
broadcasts, and that she was actively encouraged to listen to 
Lord Haw-Haw, as she may " get more truth from him" . She 
added that the prevailing opinion on the factory floor was 
that "the government ought to be shot for what they have done 
to our boys ".
Clearly, Haw-Haw listening as an alternative to the BBC 
National Service was not unheard of south of the Scottish 
border. However, the popularity of German broadcasts like 
Lord Haw-Haw and Radio Caledonia in Scotland was arguably a 
much more serious issue, due to the preexisting conditions 
(both real and imagined) that could be exploited by such 
propaganda. Such programmes, in attempting to foster 
disillusionment of the war effort through Scottish 
Nationalism, pacifism, and other minority opinions, were not 
simply providing an alternative to the BBC's existing 
broadcasts. Rather, they were operating in Scotland within a 
cultural/regional vacuum left by the BBC's unwillingness to 
provide specialised programming. This lack of concern for 
Scottish interests and the "Scottish idiom" costed the BBC 
its credibility as a trusted source of information, making it 
a significantly less effective agent of wartime communication 
between Scottish civilians and the wartime Government.
The BBC's single National Programme, like wartime 
propaganda generally, provided the heterogeneous British
nation with a vital means by which to feel drawn together as
Ministry of Information- Effects of Rumour on Morale, (Public Record 
Office, INF.1.266).
Ibid.
126
nation with a vital means by which to feel drawn together as 
a unified whole, taking part in the common struggle against 
the tyranny of the Axis. Due to the centralised nature of 
the BBC's administration and the necessity of 
synchronisation, the wireless was quickly recognised by many 
provincial listeners as having a cultural/ideological bias 
toward a certain group within the British nation; namely 
Home-Counties English. This inherent bias in what had become 
such a vital medium of British morale maintenance immediately 
became an issue in the Scottish region, whose unique position 
of being a separate nation within Britain made much of the 
BBC's programming irrelevant, if not offensive, to listeners 
there. This issue, voiced by many in Scotland and Whitehall 
as a matter of grave concern in the wide arena of morale, 
gave rise to the supposed need for Home-Front ideology in 
Scotland to be defined and served by Scots, as part of a 
separate radio wavelength.
This proposal for a separate wavelength, being based on 
the assumed need for Scotland to be treated as a separate 
nation within wartime Britain, never came to fruition. The 
potential threat of latent ideologies that Whitehall feared 
in Scotland, such as widespread communism and Scottish 
nationalism, were not enough to justify special attention in 
the field of broadcast propaganda. Rather, specialised need 
for Scottish programming was presumed to have been 
neutralised by the practical limitations inherent in the 
medium itself. The immense competition for priority in 
wartime broadcasting could always be used to deprioritise 
Scotland's unique cultural and civic programming interests, 
even after the validity of these interests had been
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Scotland's unique cultural and civic programming interests, 
even after the validity of these interests had been 
acknowledged by those who possessed authority over the BBC.
By failing to serve these specialised cultural needs, 
however, British wartime propaganda in Scotland fell short of 
its intended purpose. For centralised propaganda to be 
effective as a trusted source of information (through 
broadcasting or any other medium), it was imperative that it 
convey the cultural, political, and civic familiarity 
necessary to fully co-opt its audience. The BBC's Anglo- 
centric programming was adequate for Scotland, but only when 
it related to the Scots as Britons. On this level, 
ideological unity existed. War in Europe had created more of 
these shared cultural and civic needs than ever before, from 
mortal survival to adequate news of the war's progress. 
Despite this common ground, Scots persisted in their own 
sense of nationhood and culture. The BBC, by not giving 
special attention to this nationhood and culture, 
strengthened, rather than eliminated, the kinds of confusion, 
apathy, and alienation that served as a barrier to unity.
Chapter 8-
Conclusion
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The Second World War in Great Britain ushered in a new 
factor in warfare. It presented the civilian population as a 
German military target- a society heroically bracing itself 
against the odds and, with an unprecedented sense of unity 
and sacrifice, eventually weathering the direct attacks of 
the German Luftwaffe to emerge victorious. Unlike all others 
preceding it, this was a war of entire societies, with the 
civilians' role in victory (or defeat) unavoidably 
pronounced. Of course, the concept of direct contribution by 
the general populace to the war effort of their homeland was 
nothing new. During the Great War, for example, the 
industrial output of munitions that supported military forces 
on the Continent was a factor for which civilians, through 
war work, had direct responsibility.
In stark contrast, it would be during this war that 
factories themselves would become targets. Until late 1941, 
Britain would be defending itself against what would be the 
largest direct offensive by the Germans, as the Luftwaffe 
attempted to bring the surrender of the nation through air 
attack. It was during this period that British civilians 
were most often directly engaged in a struggle for their 
nation's survival.
Preparation for this new form of Home Front warfare by 
1939 had significantly transformed both the appearance and 
the perceptions of Great Britain. By 1940, Defence 
Regulations had effectively suspended democracy for the 
purpose of administrating the war effort. Concurrently, a 
Coalition Government had taken absolute control over 
Britain's domestic affairs, from food availability and travel
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Britain's domestic affairs, from food availability and travel 
to the content of the country's newspapers. Under the 
direction of this centralised Government, virtually every 
aspect of civilian life became linked directly to a 
collective war effort in which every individual was expected 
to play a direct role.
This common struggle was a very powerful force in 
unifying the nation. The creation of a militarised Britain 
was one that required an unprecedented level of commitment 
and cooperation on the part of the country's citizens. Such 
a level of unity and cooperation, in conjunction with the 
daily realities of war, was one that would have to be founded 
on a solid ideological justification. This fundamental 
ideological basis was amply provided by the sentiment of 
British nationalism that was aroused by mobilsation for war 
against the common enemy. Up until the end of 1941, the war 
on the British Home Front would be one of sheer survival in 
the face of the heavy German air offensive. Since this war 
would decide the fate of the British as a nation, the common 
cause was able to supersede conflicting ideologies that 
existed throughout the country, such as Communism and 
provincial nationalism. For as long as the common threat 
endured, everyone in Britain would be able to grasp the 
necessity for sacrifice and effort, regardless of varying 
perceptions of what it meant to be British.
While the common goal of survival and ultimate victory 
provided justification for the control that the Government 
retained over British life, this also heightened the sense of 
Governmental responsibility towards the needs of the people
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Governmental responsibility towards the needs of the people 
as never before. At the outset of war, the Government could 
not be certain that civilians' sense of unity and willingness 
to fight could withstand the kind of widespread horror and 
devastation caused by mass bombing. In an ongoing effort to 
directly prevent such a collective breakdown, the centralised 
British government strived throughout the war to identify and 
rectify any thought or behaviour that might pose a threat to 
Britain's collective war effort. While the maintenance of 
"civilian morale" became a pivotal aspect of the Government's 
policies on the Home Front, it also held a commanding 
influence over the British people. Morale, though not 
empirically definable, was inexorably linked with the 
perceived practical and psychological needs of civilians. 
Where such exigencies could not be met, morale demanded that 
authorities explain why the fulfillment of those needs was 
not plausible under wartime conditions.
Whitehall's ongoing concern for morale maintenance was 
extrapolated to Great Britain as a whole, identifying 
potential threats to mandated wartime ideology and taking 
active steps to remove them wherever possible. In the 
Clydeside area, however, such threats were seemingly 
perceived as more acute than in areas south of the border. 
According to Mass Observation's morale report to the 
Government in early 1941, a breakdown of morale along the 
Clyde could easily be caused by opposing ideologies like 
Communism and provincial nationalism. Beyond these specific 
ideological threats, there was also marked concern over the 
industrial unrest and perceived apathy of the local
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population, in whom the all-important perception of an 
immediate common threat simply did not exist. These specific 
dangers to morale, which were generally present throughout 
the country in some form, were thought to be exacerbated by 
the fact that Scotland, though part of Britain, was also a 
distinct and separate nation within Britain, having its own 
history, civic laws, and cultural traditions. Even after 
Glasgow had proven itself able to physically and 
psychologically withstand heavy bombing as well as any 
English blitzed city, these perceptions would be present in 
arguments being made by those who were attempting to affect 
changes in Home Front policy.
These distinctions, when examined merely as regional 
variation, were simply a natural aspect of Britain as a 
diverse but fundamentally unified nation in wartime, 
comprised of communities who were contributing to a common 
goal. Where regional distinctions and culture were removed 
or deprioritised through the channelisation of civilian daily 
life (such as the disappearance of regionally-based 
broadcasting), it could be reasonably argued that the 
sacrifice was necessary for the war effort. The nationalism 
that was aroused and maintained by Britain's war against the 
Axis was one that ideally overshadowed all other ideology and 
culture throughout the country. There is little if any 
evidence to show that there was significant objection on the 
part of specific regional groups to this sacrifice.
The sense of British nationalism that was brought to the 
fore of common ideology by the cause of war was one that 
could easily displace or co-opt various cultural differences
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inherent in the population of Great Britain. Scotland, 
however, possessed a unique culture that already worked 
within its own established mind set of nationalism. Scottish 
culture defined itself largely in opposition to English 
traditions that dominated common wartime doctrine. If 
nationalism rested upon common culture and sense of history, 
then Scotland presumedly exhibited special ideological needs 
to the centralised London-based Government. Glasgow and the 
rest of Scotland certainly shared the fundamental basis for 
unity of sacrifice and effort toward the goal of victory for 
Great Britain, but Whitehall could never presume that 
Scottish civilians would be fighting the "war of ideas" with 
the same perceptions as their English counterparts. War had 
come to Clydeside as well as the rest of Great Britain, but 
the status of Scotland as a relatively self-contained nation 
(rather than merely a region) provided added legitimacy to 
indigenous concerns, which like most issues arising out of 
the Home Front were directly tied to morale.
These special needs of Scotland, as reflected in MO's 
report on Clydeside, became an issue in the Government's 
efforts to assess and maintain morale throughout the war. 
Supposed threats to Home Front ideology, such as Communism, 
labour unrest, and provincial nationalism, were never shown 
to be noticeably more pronounced in Scotland than in the rest 
of the country. If such ideologies had been influential 
enough to usurp the loyalty of Scots in the Clydeside area, 
then a breakdown of morale would have been the result. 
However, as underscored by Whitehall's approach to 
administering wartime policies and propaganda, the mere
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perception of danger was enough to predicate real 
consequences for the. Scottish nation. Likewise, the 
practical necessity for self-contained decision-making in the 
region acted to expedite rather than overshadow the need for 
administrative devolution of Scotland. In attempting to 
emphasise the needs of Scotland in the wartime Parliament, 
"special ideological need" became a term used by those 
working within the Scottish Region to place import on 
Scotland's morale. The issue of morale in Glasgow bears out 
that due to Scotland's unique nationhood, morale could not be 
directly bolstered by supplying Anglo-centric propaganda. 
This assumption was ^reiterated by Scottish leaders like 
Thomas Johnston, who in his capacity as Scottish Secretary of 
State strived throughout the war not only to satisfy the 
immediate needs of Scottish civilians, but also to ensure a 
better future for Scotland in post-war Britain.
Clearly, the sense of separate nationhood and need for a 
certain amount of self-determination for the civic population 
of Scotland was acknowledged by Whitehall as well as 
organisations that were closely involved with morale 
maintenance in Britain. The actual conveyance of the 
prevailing ideology on the Home-Front, however, rested upon 
the British mass media. Defense Regulations had given 
Whitehall essential control of Home-Front propaganda, but the 
new medium of broadcasting, operated by the BBC, was one that 
had managed to retain its status as a widely influential and 
independent agent of propaganda throughout the war, in spite 
of its having become completely centralised in the capital. 
This was possible through the BBC's tendency to reflect the
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same centralised and paternal approach to its own task as the 
Government itself had developed from the necessities created 
by war. The BBC in fact maintained significant independence 
from Government, relative to its influence over the wartime 
public. However, since this was largely due to its tendency 
to enhance directly the unity and ideology that Whitehall 
strived to maintain, it was never seen as a threat to 
Government control. As in morale-maintenance generally, 
however, the BBC's inherent biases and practical oversights 
became a matter for major concern in regard to Scotland, 
where propaganda created with "the eyes of the Londoner" 
brought added legitimacy to the cultural separatism that 
could potentially alienate Scottish civilians from the common 
war effort. The lack of a separate Scottish wavelength, 
though clearly a result of practical wartime difficulties in 
broadcasting, was nonetheless presented as an urgent morale 
issue.
The universal goal of survival and victory for civilians 
on the Home Front in Britain was certainly one with which all 
could readily identify. However, the Glasgow experience on 
the Home Front illustrates how the British sense of 
nationalism that fueled this unity was qualified in Scotland 
by a competing sense of nationhood. War may have increased 
the perceived responsibility of the Government toward its 
people, but the Scots throughout the war were shown by agents 
of morale-maintenance to have unique needs that could not be 
patently fulfilled by a centralised, London-based government. 
The role adopted by the Government in maintaining the 
ideological unity of all civilians on the Home Front made
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many of these specialised needs clear and outspoken, and even 
wrought some concessions toward specifically Scottish 
interests. The question of the direction of Scottish unity 
and loyalty, easily answered in the face of Britain's common 
threat in 1939, was nevertheless qualified with the 
perceptions by which the British Home Front defined itself. 
In many ways, the struggle experienced by British civilians 
in war was fundamentally unifying. But when morale on the 
Clyde was interpreted by London through inherent cultural 
differences, their findings could only serve to underscore 
Whitehall's presumption that many Scots were indeed fighting 
"a war of their own".
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